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ABSTRACT
The placement of detectors in mitigation systems is a di cult problem usually ad-
dressed in the industry via qualitative and semiquantative approaches. Simplifications are
used to circumvent di culties regarding problem size, parameter uncertainty, and lack
of information concerning leak development. Given recent improvement of consequence
modeling tools, the use of a stochastic Mixed-Integer Linear Programming (MILP) for-
mulation (SP) was previously proposed to quantitatively approach this problem. This
formulation minimizes the expected damage over a large set of gas leak scenarios while
assuming perfect detectors. In reality gas detectors are prone to false positives and false
negatives. Two solutions are usually implemented in the process industries. First, ad-
ditional confirmation from several detectors (i.e., voting) is required before emergency
actions are triggered in order to avoid false positives. Second, in order to avoid false
negatives, the unavailability of the detectors is considered in the placement strategy. Un-
availability corresponds to the probability that the detector will not be able to perform its
intended function when required.
In the first part of this dissertation, two problem formulations were developed and
validated to address the issue of imperfect detectors: minimization of expected damage
considering unavailability (SP-U) and minimization of the expected damage considering
unavailability and voting (SP-UV). SP-U and SP-UV placement results were compared
with those obtained assuming perfect detectors. Results demonstrate that explicit consid-
eration of unavailability and voting e↵ects alters the final detector placement. Quantitative
risk can be significantly higher if we neglect these issues when solving for the optimal
placement. Furthermore, SP-UV placement results were compared with those of four ex-
isting approaches for gas detector placement using three di↵erent performance metrics in
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accordance to the objectives of gas detection systems. Results provide further evidence on
the e↵ectiveness of the use of dispersion simulations, and mathematical programming, to
supplement the gas detector placement problem.
Formulation SP-U assumes a uniform unavailability across all detector types and lo-
cations. In the second part of this work, this assumption is relaxed via formulation SPqt,
which considers non-uniform dynamic detector unavailabilities. Relaxing this assumption
results in a Mixed-Integer NonLinear Programming (MINLP) formulation. SPqt, being
an extension of SP-U, explicitly considers di↵erent backup detection levels, allowing an
approximation where the maximum degree of the nonlinear products considered can be
determined by the modeler. The e↵ect of reducing the number of detection levels was an-
alyzed. For the problem, results shown that two detection levels are su cient to find ob-
jective values within 1% of the optimal solution. Considering two detection levels reduces
the MINLP formulation to a zero-one quadratic formulation (SPqt-Q). A solution quality
comparison between SPqt-Q and approximate solution strategies previously proposed in
the literature demonstrates its suitability to obtain approximate answers for the general
nonlinear problem. Two exact linear reformulation strategies (SPqt-L1 and SPqt-L2) were
proposed for SPqt-Q and validated from the computationally e ciency perspective.
All the results presented were obtained by using four real data sets provided by Gex-
Con. The data corresponds to FLACS CFD dispersion simulations including the full ge-
ometric features of an o↵shore facility and capturing the uncertainty in the leak charac-
teristics. Additionally, real unavailability values were obtained from industry gas detector
reliability databases.
The work presented here constitutes a step forward toward the achievement of a re-
alistic detector placement formulation that includes current industrial practice for these
important safety systems.
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1. INTRODUCTION: MOTIVATION, CHALLENGES, AND DATA *
Gas mitigation systems usually constitute the last line of defense against health, safety,
security, and environmental disasters. While gas mitigation systems di↵er depending on
the wide variety of gases they can be designed to mitigate, they share a common condition:
the requirement to e ciently acknowledge the hazards before issuing executive actions to
minimize the hazard consequences. This condition causes the proper placement of gas
detectors to be a major concern in their design.
A key shortfall of gas detector placement approaches to date is their inability to rig-
orously handle the uncertainties quantitatively. The overwhelming amount of information
and uncertainties to consider, in conjunction with the huge number of placement possibil-
ities, presents a challenging problem. This di culty is often circumvented by the usage of
simplified qualitative and semi-quantitative approaches. When detailed gas dispersion data
is available, it is typically used only as a guideline for the placement, not taking advan-
tage of the full extent of the information that this data can provide. To fill this gap, while
considering the inherent uncertainty associated with gas detection, the use of a stochas-
* Part of this section is reprinted with permission from “Optimal Gas Detector Placement Under Uncer-
tainty Considering Conditional-Value-at-Risk” by Legg S. W., Wang C., Benavides-Serrano A. J., and
Laird C. D., 2012. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Copyright 2012 by Elsevier Ltd.
Part of this section is reprinted with permission from ”A Stochastic Programming Approach for the
Optimal Placement of Gas Detectors: Unavailability and Voting Strategies” by Benavides-Serrano, A. J.,
Legg S. W., Va´zquez-Roma´n R., Mannan, M. S., and Laird C. D., 2014. Industrial & Engineering Chem-
istry Research, Copyright 2013 by American Chemical Society. ACS Articles on Request author-directed
link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1021/ie401369v.
Part of this section is reprinted with permission from “E↵ect of Backup Detection Levels in P-Median
Formulations for Optimal Placement of Detectors in Mitigation Systems” by Benavides-Serrano, A. J.,
Hackebeil, G., Mannan, M. S., and Laird, C. D., 2014. Proceedings of the 8th International Conference
on Foundations of Computer-Aided Process Design (FOCAPD), Washington, USA, July 2014, Copyright
2014 by Elsevier Ltd.
Part of this section is reprinted with permission from “A Quantitative Assessment on the Placement
Practices of Gas Detectors in the Process Industries” by Benavides-Serrano A. J., Mannan, M. S, and
Laird C. D., 2014. To appear in the Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries.
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tic programming formulation (SP) equivalent to the P-median Problem (PMP) (Hakimi,
1965; ReVelle and Swain, 1970) was proposed and validated by Legg et al. (2012a,b);
Legg (2013); Legg et al. (2013). Results demonstrated the potential and suitability of
mathematical programming for the gas detector placement problem in mitigation systems
while rigorously considering its inherent uncertainties. This work was motivated on the
proposal and validation of formulation SP by Berry et al. (2005), for the detection of con-
tamination scenarios in municipal water networks. The results obtained in the gas detector
placement context constitutes unequivocal evidence of the wide range of applications that
formulation SP and its extensions have. The formulations presented in this work, being
generalizations of formulation SP, can be applied to a wide range of facility location and
mitigation system detector placement problems. This work will focus on the flammable
gas detection and mitigation case.
The optimization-based approaches discussed above assume that detectors are perfect.
Therefore, they do not consider two key features associated with flammable gas detector
equipment and policies: detector unavailability and voting. As recognized throughout
the industry and outlined in sources like Stiftelsen for industriell og teknisk forskning
(SINTEF) (2002), detectors are prone to a list of failure modes that include erratic or failed
output, failure to function on demand, spurious signal, and others. These failure modes
can manifest as false positives or negatives, and both these aspects should be considered.
First, the potential unavailability of detectors should be considered when designing the
system. Unavailability corresponds to the probability that the detector will not be able to
perform its intended function when required, i.e., the probability of a false negative. De-
tector unavailability is a broader concept than detector reliability. Unavailability not only
includes situations like random failure, but also considers other aspects like the detector
being o✏ine due to preventive maintenance and testing, or the absence of the detector
due to repairs or replacement. A complete discussion on the methods and considera-
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tions for the unavailability calculation is presented by Modarres et al. (2010). Placement
approaches should consider the probability that a detector will be unavailable during a
hazardous event.
Second, detection redundancy is often required before emergency actions are triggered.
A voting logic scheme is often utilized to require confirmation by k detectors before the ex-
istence of a hazard is acknowledged. This k-out-of-p detectors confirmation requirement,
where p is the total number of detectors, is commonly stated as k-o-o-p. The 2-o-o-p vot-
ing logic is the most widely used. The purpose of the implementation of these redundant
schemes is to create a system that is robust against false signals resulting from electrical
and mechanical failures, inappropriately selected set points, exposure to non-target con-
taminants, and negligible emissions from external sources (Center for Chemical Process
Safety (CCPS), 2009). More precisely, this voting logic will shield the system against
costly executive actions issued in response to false positives. In practice, initial warn-
ing actions like alarms, are often assigned to 1-o-o-p detections while further actions like
emergency shutdown systems are assigned to k-o-o-p detections.
In this work, we extend the concepts and formulations of Berry et al. (2005) and Legg
et al. (2012a) to include detector unavailability, i.e. the possibility of false negative cases,
and voting logic, in order to avoid false positive cases. These work constitutes a significant
step forward in the realism of the problem formulation.
The remainder of this work is divided into seven sections. The final part of this section
focuses on introductory concepts for flammable gas detection and mitigation systems, cur-
rent flammable gas detector placement approaches and their flaws, the motivation behind
the use of mathematical programming formulations to solve these flaws, and the data em-
ployed for the work presented. Finally, a summary of the hardware and software employed
for this work is presented. Section 2 provides a review of the treatment of imperfection
concepts in the facility location context. The theoretical and modeling concepts addressed
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by the facility location literature can be generalized and applied to a broader range of
placement problems, see for example, Malcolm and ReVelle (2005). In our particular
case, the concept of lack of service in facility location problems is the analog of detec-
tor unavailability due to reliability and maintainability considerations. Section 3 presents
formulation SP-U, an improved formulation of the Reliability PMP (RPMP) of Snyder
and Daskin (2005), which includes the concept of detector unavailability into formulation
SP. This formulation adapts the concept of backup facilities by redefining the original SP
decision variables to account for di↵erent detection levels. This redefinition, and the as-
sumption that all detectors have the same unavailability, allowed the use of a binomial dis-
tribution in the objective function to model detection failure, resulting in a mixed-integer
linear programming (MILP) formulation. Section 4 presents formulation SP-UV, a further
generalization of formulation SP-U that makes use of the negative binomial distribution
to model detector failure and voting policies while still resulting in an MILP formula-
tion. In both sections, results are presented and compared with optimal placement results
from previous formulations that ignore the extended formulation features. Unavailabil-
ity and voting logic considerations result in changes to the optimal detector placement
and significant improvements in the expected time to detection when false positives and
false negative alarms are considered. In Section 5, four existing approaches for gas detec-
tor placement were implemented and compared with the previously proposed quantitative
optimization-based approach using three di↵erent performance metrics in accordance to
the objectives of gas detection systems. Results provide further evidence on the e↵ective-
ness of the use of dispersion simulations, and mathematical programming, to supplement
the detector placement problem.
The uniform unavailability assumption used in Sections 3 and 4 (Formulations SP-U
and SP-UV, respectively) is reasonable for gas detection and mitigation systems that use
the same type of detectors under the same process, environmental, maintenance and re-
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pair conditions. However, if this is not the case, a natural extension can be used in order to
account for the non-uniform detector unavailabilities. This extension introduces nonlinear-
ities due to the multiplication of probabilities in the objective function. These nonlineari-
ties result in a Mixed-Integer Non-Linear Programming (MINLP) formulation. Motivated
by this perspective, Section 6 uses real facility data for the optimal gas detector placement
problem to determine the impact of changing the number of detection levels (i.e., the num-
ber of factors in the objective probability multiplications) and select a level of redundancy
that gives a reasonable accuracy while reducing the complexity of the MINLP. Results
show that it is reasonable to consider two detection levels in order to obtain a zero-one
Quadratic Programming (QP) formulation that can be solved to optimality with minimal
deterioration of the optimal objective. In Section 7 we present a general formulation, SPqt,
that considers non-uniform dynamic detector unavailabilities. This formulation, based on
the SP-U formulation, explicitly considers detection levels. This feature, and the results
presented in Section 6, allowed us to propose a truncated version of SPqt, SPqt-Q, to e -
ciently obtain approximate answers for the general nonlinear problem. The computational
e ciency of two exact linear reformulation strategies (SPqt-L1 and SPqt-L2) for formu-
lation SPqt-Q is analyzed in section 7.3. Finally, formulation SPqt-Q solution quality is
compared against current solution strategies for the full nonlinear problem. A summary,
conclusions, and future work are presented in Section 8.
1.1 Gas Detector Placement: Importance, Current Performance, and Challenges
Gas detectors constitute the key component of the flammable gas detection system,
an important safety system with interfaces to several other safety safeguards. Incidents
like the Buncefield fire are tangible and harsh reminders of this importance and the need
for proper detection. The Buncefield fire (Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board,
2008a,b) was a major conflagration caused by a series of explosions at the Hertfordshire
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Oil Storage Terminal, an oil storage facility. The incident took place when a high-level
switch failed to operate during a normal night filling operation. According to the calcu-
lations, on the morning of December 11, 2005, between 5:20 am and 5:30 am, a tank
overflowed causing a pool formation and the subsequent formation of a vapor cloud. From
5:30 am until 6:00 am the vapor cloud thickened and spread. The first and largest ex-
plosion occurred at 6:01 am. This led to a domino e↵ect, which eventually overwhelmed
20 large storage tanks. Forty minutes were available to avoid this incident if appropriate
detection and mitigation would have been in place. As part of the conclusions and rec-
ommendations, the investigation report (Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board,
2008a,b) that followed this incident stated that improvements were necessary in the design
and siting of the systems for detection of flammable vapors.
Despite receiving widespread media and general public attention due to third party
damages, the property damage value of the Buncefield incident was small compared to
other catastrophic incidents experienced by the hydrocarbon industry. From a review of
the 100 largest property damage losses, around 70 are attributed to fires, explosions, and/or
vapor cloud explosions (Marsh, 2012). These are all incidents where the fire and gas detec-
tion system played, or could have played, an important role in preventing further damages
after loss of containment. The number of incidents remains high, and the data do not
indicate a decreasing trend. Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE)
(2012) data for the US outer continental shelf attributed a total of 1612 incidents to fires
and explosions from 1996 to 2011 (Not including 2006), 649 of them in the period from
2007´2011. Health and Safety Executive (HSE) (2007) data from 1980 to 2005 for float-
ing o↵shore units attributed a total of 296 incidents to fires and explosions, 235 of them in
the period from 1990´2005. The Petroleum Safety Authority (2012) reported that there
is not significant statistical evidence to support the idea that there has been a reduction in
the number of leaks per facility year in the Norwegian continental shelf. This conclusion
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was obtained for leak rates greater than 0.1 kg/s, and compared data from 2011 against the
average for the period 2003´2010. Furthermore, the Health and Safety Executive (HSE)
(1997, 2003) reported that less than 50% of the known releases in o↵shore facilities are
detected by the facility’s gas detection system. If unknown releases are considered, the
actual fraction of releases detected is even lower.
To a great extent this poor detection performance is attributed to the problem of sub-
optimal detector placement. While e↵ective technology exists for gas detection, several
di culties make the problem of gas detector placement in the process industry challeng-
ing. Leak location, size, and duration are generally unknown, leading to a large uncer-
tainty space and a large number of potential leak scenarios to consider. Second, formal
quantification of the risk for any given leak scenario is di cult. The gas leak dispersion
development and transport depend on fluid properties, environmental factors, and facility
geometry. Reliable gas dispersion simulations are needed to accurately assess leak de-
velopment. Personnel, assets and production, environmental, and business image costs
should be considered. For flammable releases, explosion and fire consequences need to be
assessed, requiring the formal quantification of ignition probabilities, structural damage,
personnel location patterns, and human response. Finally, even if all this data is consol-
idated with the highest quality, due to the combinatorial aspects of the problem, exhaus-
tive search is not an option. For example, assuming a detector placement study identifies
1000 candidate detector locations, the number of possible placement combinations will be
21000 « 10300.
The correct placement of detectors in mitigation systems not only impacts safety, but
it also has an e↵ect on the proper allocation of resources. According to Bratteteig et al.
(2011), the cost of adding to or modifying existing detector layouts in facilities can be
prohibitive. Given the high cost of the detector system and the importance of this key
layer of protection, it is imperative that we make the best use of these economic resources
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by developing an improved quantitative approach for detector placement.
1.2 Gas Detector and their Placement Practices in the Process Industries
Catalytic and infrared gas detectors are the most commonly used detectors for the
detection of combustible gas clouds (Health and Safety Executive (HSE), 2011; Nolan,
2010). Catalytic gas detectors provide an accurate measurement of contaminant concen-
tration in air through an oxidation-reduction reaction on a catalyst. While these detectors
have the benefit of a low unit cost, they are susceptible to catalyst poisoning and will only
reveal a failure of the unit when inspected through regular maintenance. Conversely, in-
frared detectors have a higher unit cost and lower maintenance requirement. These detec-
tors operate by detecting the absorption of infrared energy by the surrounding contaminant
cloud. This means that the detectors can detect contaminants over larger distances, but pro-
vide lower overall accuracy in terms of concentration quantification. These detectors can
operate as point detectors and line-of-sight detectors. Line-of-sight detectors can detect
a contaminant cloud crossing a beam over extremely long distances. They also possess
the added benefit of failing positive, allowing for immediate detection of a failed detector.
Unfortunately, these detectors provide a concentration measure that is integrated over dis-
tance, so therefore do not provide a precise concentration of the contaminant cloud. Either
fixed or portable detectors are available; however, for the applications presented in this
work, only fixed detectors are considered.
Regulations, standards and recommended practices for gas detection systems mostly
provide general guidelines regarding the placement of fixed gas detectors. Recommenda-
tions and requirements are focused on installation, testing and performance, calibration,
detection technologies and the type of actions expected in response to a confirmed gas
leak. Most of them do not provide guidelines regarding the number of detectors or the
placement strategies that should be used. Examples include: FM Global (2001), American
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Petroleum Institute (API) (2001) (Section C.1.3.2) , International Society of Automation
(ISA) (2003) (IEC 61779-6 Mod, Section 6), National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
(2007) (Section 6.5.2.7.1), Canadian Standards Association (2001), Health and Safety Ex-
ecutive (HSE) (2001) (Section 4), International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
(2003), International Organization for Standardization (ISO) (1999) (Appendix B.6), Rus-
sian agency on technical regulating and metrology (GOST) (1981), Det Norske Veritas
(DNV) (2008) (Section 4.D), and Oil & Gas UK (UKOOA) (2003). More recently the
use of dispersion studies has gained recognition as a tool to better understand the behavior
of the releases, e.g., EC 60079-29-2 (Section 8) (International Electrotechnical Commis-
sion (IEC), 2007), and NORSOK STANDARD S-001 (Sections 12 and 13) (Norsk Sokkels
Konkuranseposisjon (NORSOK), 2008). However, in the above-mentioned sources, meth-
ods for determining gas detector placement using data provided by dispersion studies are
not specified, and common industry practice considers only a limited set of high-impact
scenarios.
The generality of these regulations, standards and recommended practices in conjunc-
tion with the inherent challenges of the gas detector placement problem enumerated in
Section 1.1, has resulted in a widespread use of prescriptive and qualitative detector place-
ment approaches. These strategies rely upon the identification of key process equipment,
development of credible release scenarios, and are based upon the properties of the par-
ticular gases being studied. Qualitative methods for the placement of gas detectors are
outlined in the guidelines set forth by Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) (2009).
These methods can be categorized by their main intended purpose. These categories in-
clude source monitoring, volumetric monitoring, enclosure monitoring, perimeter moni-
toring, and path of travel and target receptor monitoring. Examples include NFPA 15 (Sec-
tion 6.5.2.7.1) (National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), 2007), API RP 14C (Sec-
tion C.1.3.2) (American Petroleum Institute (API), 2001), ANSI/ISA-RP12.13.02 (IEC
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61779-6 Mod) (International Society of Automation (ISA), 2003), IEC 60079-29-2 (Inter-
national Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), 2007), Health and Safety Executive (HSE)
(1993) (Section 6), Health and Safety Executive (HSE) (2001) (Section 4.6), Oil & Gas
UK (UKOOA) (1995), Nolan (2010) (Section 17.6), and ISA-TR84.00.07 (Annex A.2,
Step 7) (International Society of Automation (ISA), 2010).
Dispersion studies are generally perceived to be of significant importance, though
methods for determining gas detector placement do not always utilize the full value of
the data provided by these studies. It was not until recently that standardization entities
started assessing the use of these metrics in performance-based designs. ISA-TR84.00.07-
2010 (International Society of Automation (ISA), 2010) is the state of the art in this body
of literature. Scenarios and geographical coverage quantification is proposed as metrics to
achieve a desired risk reduction in the design of fire and gas detection systems.
In order to increase the e↵ectiveness of many of the approaches mentioned previ-
ously, risk and programming approaches have been coupled with the semi-quantitative
approaches. Strøm and Bakke (1999) proposed a performance-based algorithm for the
detector placement where potential detectors locations are ranked according to an over-
all e ciency metric and selected by the ranking. The grid of potential detector loca-
tions is defined within the volume of the facility and the overall e ciency is calculated
for each potential detector. ISA-TR84.00.07 (International Society of Automation (ISA),
2010) proposed an iterative approach to detector placement. First, a candidate placement
is chosen and a coverage-based mitigated risk assessment is performed. If the desired risk
threshold is not met, the gas detector placement is modified and the process is repeated.
DeFriend et al. (2008) proposed a risk-based methodology to determine the maximum gas
cloud size that must be detected to maintain a tolerable risk level for the facility. Addi-
tionally, methodologies with optimization concepts were also considered. In Dhillon and
Chakrabarty (2003), probabilities of missed detection and coverage considerations were
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incorporated into two general purpose algorithms. A genetic algorithm with elitist selec-
tion was proposed by Obenschain et al. (2004), where population members were assigned
fitness scores and the members with the highest scores were carried into the next popu-
lation. Gencer et al. (2008) proposed mathematical models to optimally locate chemical
detector systems and alarm systems to provide e↵ective interaction between both systems.
Lee and Kulesz (2008) developed an iterative dynamic programming algorithm designed
to create a detector placement that minimizes a risk-based objective function.
While these approaches strive for performance based quantitative designs, and they
represent improvements over qualitative techniques, they fail to fully overcome the dif-
ficulties described earlier. Lack of probabilistic scenario analysis, oversimplification in
metrics and risk considerations, and the use of non-optimal methods to achieve the design
objective are their most common flaws. A more systematic approach is still desired to
address several key issues. First, the estimated performance of a particular gas detector
placement is highly dependent on important outputs such as point concentrations, cloud
size, and detection times. Rigorous simulation of gas dispersion is needed to accurately
calculate these outputs, and several key variables such as process conditions and geome-
try, leak locations and gas properties, and weather conditions all have significant impact
on these dispersion simulations. The influence of these key variables is reviewed in the
works by Kelsey et al. (2002), Kelsey et al. (2005), Bratteteig et al. (2011), and Marx and
Cornwell (2009). Furthermore, much of the existing work and industry practice is based
on heuristics or analyses considering only a limited set of high-impact scenarios. These
methods do not provide a rigorous treatment of the high levels of uncertainty associated
with variables like leak location, leak characteristics, and weather conditions. Because
the uncertainty space for these variables is large, a high number of plant-specific leak
scenarios are required. With these simulations however, it is possible to evaluate key per-
formance metrics like the expected detection time. Additionally, using simulation data
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from many scenarios, statistics on these metrics can be calculated to provide confidence in
detector placements. Finally, many of the programming techniques previously discussed
provide no guarantee of global optimality. Even when guarantees against suboptimality
are provided, the detector placement metrics do not consider the important key variables
necessary. An optimization-based approach that considers uncertainty while using the
valuable dispersion simulation data provided by rigorous dispersion models and providing
guarantees of optimality is preferred.
1.3 Input Data for Formulations
This subsection presents the data employed for the generation of the results in the fol-
lowing sections. Two main data types and sources were employed: Dispersion simulation
data provided by GexCon US and real gas detector unavailability data from reliability
databases.
1.3.1 CFD Dispersion Simulations
Dispersion simulations for this study were performed following standards and rec-
ommendations specially designed for capturing the gas dispersion problem uncertainties
(Norsk Sokkels Konkuranseposisjon (NORSOK), 2001, 2008). The procedure is outlined
in Hansen and Middha (2008) and Hansen et al. (2013). The availability of this high qual-
ity data was the main motivation behind the particularization of this study to flammable gas
detection and mitigation systems. This data is a superset of the data previously employed
by Legg et al. (2012a,b); Legg (2013); Legg et al. (2013).
An initial assessment was carried out in order to determine the candidate detector lo-
cations (L). This assessment was based on considerations regarding variable costs such as
wiring, detection likelihood, accessibility and technical viability for installation, inspec-
tion and maintenance activities. Subsequently, a set S of possible leak source locations
was assessed. Commonly assessed leak situations include material deterioration (e.g. cor-
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rosion, erosion, fatigue failure), inadequate sealing and welding, collision, overfilling,
overpressures, and runaway reaction. Based on the set of possible leak source locations
S , a set A of leak scenarios was simulated using the CFD code FLACS (GexCon, 2011).
The use of CFD simulations is a recommended practice in order to guarantee the quality
of the input data, especially for facilities with intricate geometries. Nevertheless, when
the geometry and other relevant considerations allow for the use of simpler models, these
might be used in order to reduce the computational requirements of scenario generation.
Scenario modeling and simulation involved the examination of inventories, process con-
ditions, type of releases, air movement and ventilation patterns, and geometric details of
the given module. To acknowledge the stochasticity of the leak scenario a combination
of di↵erent leak characteristics (size, flow, etc), wind velocities and wind directions were
included in the analysis for each leak source location. Scenarios were generated for a
wide range of leak conditions, excluding those that are so small as to be negligible or
undetectable, and those that are so large as to be noticed by changes in process variables.
Results were generated using 4 independent data sets. Simulations were performed
on a real, medium-scale, proprietary o↵shore facility geometry capturing the full process
features, i.e. equipment, piping, support structures, etc. The gas composition consist
of a mixture of light alkanes, mostly methane. The di↵erent data sets correspond to 4
di↵erent modules in the same facility. Data set A is composed of 270 release scenarios and
994 potential point detector locations. Data set B is composed of 145 scenarios and 943
potential point detector locations. Data set C is composed of 78 scenarios and 607 potential
point detector locations. Data set D is composed of 314 scenarios and 768 potential point
detector locations. The volumes to monitor were 21, 000m3 (28m ˆ 60m ˆ 12.5m),
10, 548m3 (21mˆ 48mˆ 10.5m), 3, 570m3 (17mˆ 30mˆ 7m), and 2, 520m3 (12mˆ
30mˆ 7m), respectively. The smaller length corresponds to the height in all cases.
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1.3.2 Gas Detector Unavailability in the Process Industries
Typical gas detector unavailability values in the process industries were employed for
all the formulation validation and testing. A review is presented below. Notation is sum-
marized in Table A.1 (Appendix A).
First, a distinction must be make between the instantaneous unavailability, qptq, and
the time-averaged unavailability, q¯. The instantaneous unavailability, qptq, is the unavail-
ability at a given time t ° 0. The time-averaged unavailability, q¯, is the average value
of the instantaneous unavailability over a length of time. These two values are related by
Equation (1.1).
q¯ “ 1
t2 ´ t1
ª t2
t1
qptq dt (1.1)
For gas detectors, failure to function on demand is most likely detected upon testing
and inspection. Modarres et al. (2010) denotes this type of equipment as periodically in-
spected (tested) systems with instantaneous and time-averaged unavailabilities given by
Equations (1.2) and (1.3), respectively. Parameters   and TO represent the detector con-
stant failure rate (h´1) and the detector operating time (up time) (h), respectively. Equa-
tions (1.2) and (1.3) assume that testing and repair are perfect and small in comparison
with the detector operation time, and therefore can be neglected in the unavailability cal-
culation.
qptq “  t (1.2)
q¯ “ 1
2
 TO (1.3)
One of the most recognized sources available for the determination of parameter   in
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Equations (1.2) and (1.3) is the O↵shore REliability DAta (OREDA) database (Stiftelsen
for industriell og teknisk forskning (SINTEF), 2009). The OREDA project is an initiative
of several of the world’s major oil and gas companies to collect and analyze real o↵shore
equipment maintenance and reliability data in order to provide input to reliability analy-
ses. According to this database, the constant failure rate,  , of infrared hydrocarbon gas
detectors (most commonly used type of flammable gas detector) undergoing a failure to
function on demand was estimated to have an average value of 1.03˚10´6ph´1qwith a 90%
confidence interval of [0.06 ˚ 10´6ph´1q, 3.62 ˚ 10´6ph´1qs. These values were computed
based on a population of 221 detectors surveyed on 6 di↵erent o↵shore facilities over a
total operational time of 6.05˚106 hours. The multiple facility sample was aggregated and
fitted to a Gamma distribution following the considerations provided by Spjøtvoll (1985).
Based on this data, and making use of Equations (1.2) and (1.3), the expected values of
the instantaneous and time-averaged unavailabilities and their 90% confidence intervals
are presented in Figures 1.1 and 1.2, respectively.
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Figure 1.1: Gas detector instantaneous unavailability ( ) and its 90% confidence interval
( ) as a function of time, t, for TO“2 years.
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Figure 1.2: Gas detector time-averaged unavailability ( ) and its 90% confidence interval
( ) as a function of detector operating time (up time), To.
In the case of Figure 1.1, a detector operating time before testing and repair (TO) of 2
years was assumed. However, gas detectors in the industry are expected to be tested and
repaired more regularly. Under the assumption of perfect repairs, every time the detector
is maintained/repaired it is assumed that it goes back to an ”as good as new” condition
(i.e., q“0). For a detector operating time of 2 years the expected value of the instantaneous
unavailability is„ 0.03, and the upper bound of the 90% confidence interval never exceeds
0.1. Figure 1.2 presents time-averaged unavailability values for di↵erent values of detector
operating time (up time), TO. For the extreme case of a detector undergoing „ 10 years
without testing and repair, the expected value of the time-averaged unavailability does not
exceed 0.08, and the upper bound of the 90% confidence interval is close to 0.2. A gas
detector in a facility with standard maintenance and repair intervals (i.e., TO†2 years) can
be expected to have time-averaged unavailabilities below 0.05 (the upper bound of the
90% confidence interval for an operating time of 2 years is 0.032).
Typical industry rules of thumb assign unavailability values up to 0.1 to the whole de-
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tection system equipment unavailability. However, this number includes factors like emer-
gency shutdown system actuation failure and detector coverage considerations for small
leaks. Based on this consideration, the real gas detector unavailability values presented
in Figures 1.1 and 1.2, and assuming standard repair and maintenance practices, it can be
conservatively assumed that actual instantaneous and time-averaged unavailability values
for gas detectors (i.e. including wiring and additional equipment failure considerations)
are between 0.01 and 0.1.
1.4 Software and Hardware
All the problem formulation presented in this work were formulated in Pyomo and
solved using either CPLEX 12.2 (Sections 3-6), CPLEX 12.5 (Section 7), or Gurobi 5.6
(Section 7). The Python Optimization Modeling Objects (Pyomo) software package (Hart
et al., 2011, 2012) is an open source tool for the definition and solution of optimization
problems within the high-level programming language Python. Pyomo supports the rep-
resentation of linear, mixed-integer linear, nonlinear, and nonlinear mixed-integer models,
while providing the user with the capability to access the wide set of Python supporting
libraries. Pyomo is a package within the Coopr (COmmon Optimization Python Reposi-
tory) software library.
A dual quad-core Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU X5482 with a clock speed of 3.2GHz and 18
GB RAM was used to solve the problem instances presented in Sections 3-6. The timing
results presented in Section 7 were obtained using an Intel Xeon CPU E5-2697 v2 with a
clock speed of 2.7 GHz and 264 GB of RAM.
The Pyomo and Python files necessary for the generation of the results presented in
this work are presented in Appendices B-P.
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2. BACKGROUND: PREVIOUS WORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW *
In this section, a review is presented outlining the concepts and previous developments
on which the work at hand is built. First, the main mathematical programming formula-
tion, SP, is discussed. The formulation is outlined, along with the motivations and specific
advantages behind its use in the detector placement problem for mitigation systems. Pre-
vious extensions to formulation SP, which originated from within our research group, are
also presented. Finally, a literature review of the treatment of the concept of imperfect
detectors is presented. The use of mathematical programming formulations, and in par-
ticular formulation SP, to address the detector placement problem in mitigation systems
is quite recent, making the literature directly dealing with it scarce. However, several op-
timal placement problems considering redundancy, backup coverage, and unavailability
have been previously developed and studied in operations research, under the umbrella of
optimal facility location. Once it is recognized that the detector placement problem is an
optimal facility location problem, it is possible to extrapolate several of the concepts pre-
sented in these previous formulations to the problem at hand. This literature review will
be focused in these formulations.
* Part of this section is reprinted with permission from “E↵ect of Backup Detection Levels in P-Median
Formulations for Optimal Placement of Detectors in Mitigation Systems” by Benavides-Serrano, A. J.,
Hackebeil, G., Mannan, M. S., and Laird, C. D., 2014. Proceedings of the 8th International Conference
on Foundations of Computer-Aided Process Design (FOCAPD), Washington, USA, July 2014, Copyright
2014 by Elsevier Ltd.
Part of this section is reprinted with permission from “Optimal Gas Detector Placement Under Uncer-
tainty Considering Conditional-Value-at-Risk” by Legg S. W., Wang C., Benavides-Serrano A. J., and
Laird C. D., 2012. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Copyright 2012 by Elsevier Ltd.
Part of this section is reprinted with permission from ”A Stochastic Programming Approach for the
Optimal Placement of Gas Detectors: Unavailability and Voting Strategies” by Benavides-Serrano, A. J.,
Legg S. W., Va´zquez-Roma´n R., Mannan, M. S., and Laird C. D., 2014. Industrial & Engineering Chem-
istry Research, Copyright 2013 by American Chemical Society. ACS Articles on Request author-directed
link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1021/ie401369v.
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2.1 Formulation SP and Previously Addressed Extensions
Given the large uncertainty space and the combinatorial problem of selecting detector
locations, numerical optimization is a promising quantitative approach for the problem of
detector placement in mitigation systems. In order to determine an optimal detector place-
ment while rigorously considering inherent detection and mitigation system variables and
uncertainties, Berry et al. (2006b) proposed the use of a Mixed Integer Linear Program-
ming (MILP) formulation. This formulation (SP), based on the P-Median Problem (PMP)
(Hakimi, 1965; ReVelle and Swain, 1970), is a stochastic programming formulation that
determines a detector placement that minimizes the expected value of a damage coe cient
across a large number of hazardous scenarios. This initial work by Berry et al. (2006b)
successfully applied the formulation to the detection of contaminants in water networks.
Motivated by these results, Legg et al. (2012b) applied formulation SP to flammable gas
mitigation systems. Point detectors used in water networks detect contamination only in
the instance where the contaminant passes directly through the location of the detectors
(Berry et al., 2005). In this sense, the detectors act in the same manner as the fixed infrared
(point and line-of-sight) and catalytic gas detectors typically used in process facilities (Fire
& Safety World Online, 2011). The significant di↵erence between detector placement for-
mulations for water network problems and those for open-air dispersion problems are the
simulation frameworks used to create the contamination scenario data. In the water net-
work problems (Berry et al., 2006b), the network model EPANET is used to generate the
data necessary. Because our work considers process facilities, flammable gas releases,
rather than water quality simulations, are the scenarios of interest. Therefore, gas disper-
sion software (CFD in this case) is needed to generate rigorous simulations for the wide
range of process conditions, leak locations, and weather conditions possible. By mak-
ing use of data set A described in Section 1.3.1, Legg et al. (2012b) further validated the
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potential and general applicability of formulation SP to approach the detector placement
problem in mitigation systems while rigorously considering its inherent uncertainties.
2.1.1 Formulation SP
Formulation SP from Berry et al. (2005), i.e., the PMP for detector placement, is pre-
sented in Problem (2.1). Data requirements and notation for the formulations in this paper
is summarized in Table A.1. The Pyomo model file containing formulation SP is presented
in Appendix F.
min
ÿ
aPA
↵a
ÿ
iPLa
da,ixa,i (2.1a)
s.t.ÿ
iPLa
xa,i “ 1 @ a P A (2.1b)
ÿ
lPL
sl § p (2.1c)
xa,i § si @ a P A, i P LazDa (2.1d)
sl P t0, 1u @ l P L (2.1e)
0 § xa,i § 1 @ a P A, i P La (2.1f)
Here, the set L represents the set of all potential detector locations, and the set A
represents the set of hazardous scenarios considered. Since each hazardous scenario does
not necessarily a↵ect all potential detector locations, subsets La, are defined such that La
contains all the detector locations that can detect hazardous scenario a. The probability
of occurrence of a particular hazardous scenario a is represented by the parameter ↵a.
The parameter da,i is the damage coe cient associated with hazardous scenario a, if that
scenario is first detected by a detector at location i. The maximum number of detectors
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that can be allocated is given by p. Two variables are used in the problem, sl and xa,i.
Variable sl is a binary decision variable that signals the existence of a detector at location
l (sl“1, and 0 otherwise). Variable xa,i indicates whether a detector is the first to detect
a scenario a at location i (xa,i“1, and 0 otherwise). While xa,i is a continuous variable in
the PMP, under reasonable assumptions it is guaranteed to converge to an integer solution
(Berry et al., 2006b)
The goal of the objective function in Eq. (2.1a) is to minimize the expected value
of the desired consequence metric. Constraint (2.1b) enforces the requirement that each
hazardous scenario needs to be detected by at least one detector. To account for scenarios
that go undetected, this constraint can be relaxed by adding dummy variables (Da) to
xa,i, i.e., augmenting La with an index i for a dummy variable. Dummy variables are
associated with damage coe cient values, dmax, that penalize any undetected hazardous
scenarios. Constraint (2.1c) provides an upper limit, p, on the number of detectors allowed.
Constraint (2.1d) ensures that location i can only be the first to detect hazardous scenario
a if there is a detector placed at location i.
Several features of the the PMP formulation make it suitable for the placement of de-
tectors in mitigation systems. First, it o↵ers a direct coupling between the detector place-
ment and the detection and mitigation system risk minimization objective. As presented
by Crowl and Louvar (2011), risk is defined as a measure of the health, environmental, or
economic losses in terms of both loss scenario likelihood and loss scenario magnitude. The
ultimate goal of objective function (2.1a) is the minimization of risk, the probability of the
loss scenario multiplied by the scenario resulting consequence. Particular risk metrics are
used for di↵erent types of detection and mitigations systems. For instance, in the case of
water networks risk metrics include the population exposed and the mass of toxic agent re-
moved from the network via demand. In flammable gas detection and mitigation systems,
risk metrics include the time to detection for a predetermined percentage of the Lower
21
Flammability Limit (LFL) concentration and the total volume of the flammable gas cloud.
The PMP formulation can exactly accommodate these relevant detection and mitigation
system risk metrics by changing the definition of the damage coe cient. Furthermore, if
the loss scenario development is well understood, and its final consequences can be fully
quantified, the damage coe cient can ultimately represent the aggregated health, safety,
security, and environmental losses. Second, damage coe cients are determined from a
preprocessing step in which relevant hazardous scenarios are assessed and simulated. This
enables the use of the wide variety of hazard-specific modeling software available for the
assessment of scenario probabilities and consequences. The complex non-linearities and
uncertainty related to the hazardous scenario development are captured in a traceable man-
ner by this step without impacting the formulation solution time. Since the computational
e↵ort associated with the PMP solution is often relatively small in comparison to the e↵ort
associated with scenario generation, designers can reuse the simulation data many times
in order to test di↵erent problem extensions, objectives, numbers of detectors, tolerances,
etc. Third, the PMP is a well-reviewed problem in facility siting with an extensive list
of solution strategies and problem extensions that can be readily extrapolated to detector
placement problems. This list continues to grow, supported by the detector placement
community, as presented in the sections below. Two formulation extensions, SP-C and
SP-CVaR, are presented below.
2.1.2 Formulation SP-C: Coverage Constraints
Legg et al. (2012a) and Legg (2013), presented and assessed a modified form of the
SP formulation (SP-C) that incorporated an additional coverage constraint requiring that
some level of spatial coverage be maintained while still attempting to optimize the detector
placement. This additional coverage constraint is presented in Equation (2.2) below.
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ÿ
cPCl
sc • 1, @ l P L (2.2)
Set Cl represents the set of all locations that provide coverage to candidate location
l. For this purpose, a coverage radius is initially determined and subsequently, for each
location l, the set Cl is defined in a preprocessing step as all the candidate detector lo-
cations contained within the volume predetermined by the coverage radius. Constraint
(2.2) requires every candidate location l in the facility to be provided coverage by at least
one detector placed within the predetermined volume. This additional constraint embeds
the volumetric approach logic, a common detector placement scheme in the process in-
dustries, within formulation SP. The volumetric approach was presented in Section 1.2
and is further discussed and assessed in Section 5. Following the work by Mak et al.
(1999), a Monte-Carlo sampling procedure was used to determine confidence intervals on
the probability distributions of expected time to detection (objective function) and fraction
of covered scenarios.
The addition of the coverage constraint improves the resilience of both detector place-
ment metrics to unforeseen scenarios, a specially important result for cases in which the
uncertainty space has not been extensively or properly sampled. Furthermore, when com-
pared against a coverage-only placement, both formulation SP and SP-C significantly out-
perform this approach. This provides further demonstration of the value of quantitative
hazardous scenario data (i,e., CFD-dispersion simulations) and the use of mathematical
programming to post-process this data.
2.1.3 Formulation SP-CVaR: Improved Tail Behavior
The minimization of formulation SP objective function, that is, the minimization of
the expected value of the damage coe cient, is not a guarantee of satisfactory worst-case
scenario performance. The solution of formulation SP objective might have associated
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with it hazardous scenarios with damage coe cients greater than what is acceptable. To
address this issue, Legg et al. (2013) and Legg (2013) presented and evaluated a further
extension to the model, SP-CVaR, which improves the tail-behavior of the distributions of
detection times by considering the Conditional-Value-at-Risk (CVaR) in the optimization
formulation.
The CVaR metric is based on the Value-at-Risk (VaR) metric. VaR corresponds to
the maximum expected damage coe cient within a predetermined level of confidence.
CVaR corresponds to the mean value of the damage coe cient, given the condition that
the damage coe cient is higher than the VaR. That is, VaR corresponds to a threshold
value for the tail of the probability distribution, while CVaR corresponds to a mean value
of the tail of the probability distribution. However, as discussed by Krokhmal et al. (2011),
VaR lacks key properties suitable for optimization and control applications, like convexity
and subadditivity. CVaR is not only easy to compute, but also possesses several of these
attractive mathematical features (Artzner et al., 1999). CVaR, to improve tail behavior,
was implemented by adding Equations (2.3) below to the original SP formulation.
 ` 1
1´ ✓
ÿ
aPA
za↵a § CVaR˚ (2.3a)
za • 0 @a P A (2.3b)
za •
ÿ
iPLa
da,ixa,i ´   @a P A (2.3c)
Parameter ✓ corresponds to the desired confidence level. Parameter CVaR˚ is a pre-
computed upper bound on the CVaR value of formulation SP solution.
Legg et al. (2013) and Legg (2013) applied formulation SP-CVaR to data set A, and
data sets A, B, and C, respectively. CVaR considerations into formulation SP results in im-
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proved tail-behavior with little penalization to the expected time to detection. This result
is of special interest when put in the context of detector placement for mitigation sys-
tems design, it indicates that it is possible to mitigate the e↵ect of Low-Probability High-
Consequence (LPHC) scenarios without compromising the system performance against
the common low-consequence scenarios. The LPHC scenario risk (likelihood of the inci-
dent ˆ expected loss in case of the incident), while being equivalent or higher than that of
most common events, can be easily disregarded leading to catastrophic events.
2.2 Literature Review: Optimal Placement of Imperfect Facilities
As discussed before, a literature review of the treatment of imperfect facilities in the
operations research context is presented in this section. The main goal of this body of
literature has been the optimization of service facility placement, particularly emergency
medical services (EMS). The development of these problem formulations was principally
driven by a desire to extend previously developed problems to allow for the disruption of
service. These considerations were initially applied to set covering problems, such as the
Location Set Covering Problem (LSCP) (Toregas et al., 1971) and the Maximal Coverage
Location Problem (MCLP) (Church and ReVelle, 1974), and later extended to the the PMP.
Set covering problems (LSCP, MCLP) and PMPs correspond to discrete facility location
models extensively used in EMS allocation (Daskin, 2008). Besides a common taxonomy,
these problems also share several theoretical links as presented by Church and Weaver
(1986) and rea rmed in the e↵orts to unify location-allocation formulations (Lei, 2010).
Despite these similarities, backup and facility unavailability considerations into the PMP
are more recent and focused in the supply chain context.
Categorization of facility location models is provided by Owen and Daskin (1998),
ReVelle and Eiselt (2005), ReVelle et al. (2008) and Daskin (2008). Applications, exten-
sions, and solution methods of the LSCP, MCLP and PMP have been studied by Marianov
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and Serra (2004), ReVelle and Williams (2004), Daskin and Dean (2005), Reese (2006),
Jia et al. (2007), Church and Murray (2009), Marianov and Serra (2009) and Farahani
et al. (2012). It is worth mentioning that another body of literature addressed the backup
and unavailability issues through queuing (Berman et al., 1987; Larson, 1974, 1975). This
approach is valid for facilities, but not for detectors.
2.2.1 Covering Models: Redundant Coverage Formulations
The first approaches to the maximization of backup coverage were modifications of
the LSCP. Both Berlin (1972) and Daskin and Stern (1981) proposed a bi-objective prob-
lem. A first objective follows the LSCP and minimizes the number of emergency vehicles
needed to cover a given area, while the second objective function seeks to maximize the
extent of the multiple coverage for the area. Benedict (1983), Hogan and ReVelle (1986),
and Eaton et al. (1986) extended the backup coverage considerations from the LSCP to the
MCLP. The Backup Coverage Problem (BACOP) proposed by Hogan and ReVelle (1986)
seeks to maintain a more uniform level of service by avoiding situations where no ambu-
lance is available when service is demanded. Two formulations are provided, BACOP1
and BACOP2. BACOP1 requires initial coverage at each demand node while BACOP2
allows trading between initial and backup coverage. Pirkul and Schilling (1989) expanded
the MCLP in order to include the workload capacities on facilities and multiple coverage
levels. Gendreau et al. (1997) proposed the Double Standard Model (DSM) which seeks to
maximize the total demand that is covered by at least two service facilities. Erdemir et al.
(2010) extended the coverage definition to allow for response time and total service time
in complex coverage situations, such as those with air and ground EMS vehicles. Exten-
sions for both the LSCP and the MCLP were presented: the Set Cover with Backup Model
(SCBM) and the Maximal Cover for a Given Budget Model (MCGBM), respectively.
Applications of the MCLP with backup considerations outside the EMS literature have
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been pursued by Malcolm and ReVelle (2005) and Curtin et al. (2010). Malcolm and ReV-
elle (2005) presented the Maximal Species Backup Coverage (MSBC) for the protection
of endangered species. Curtin et al. (2010) introduced the Police Patrol Area Covering
(PPAC), where GIS and crime data is integrated to determine the e cient distribution of
police patrols.
2.2.2 Covering Models: Unavailability Formulations
Two di↵erent approaches have been applied that include unavailability considerations
in covering formulations. In this body of literature, unavailability and reliability are treated
as equivalent concepts. In the first approach, chance constraints are included. Chapman
and White (1974) and Aly and White (1978) used structured chance constraints to inte-
grate the unavailability of service into the LSCP by accounting for the busy fraction of
vehicles and a service reliability factor. The busy fraction is analogous to the detector
unavailability. ReVelle and Hogan (1988, 1989a) extended this via the Probabilistic Lo-
cation Set Covering Problem (PLSCP) by using a methodology to estimate zone specific
busy fractions. PLSCP concepts were integrated with the MCLP in the Maximum Avail-
ability Location Problem (MALP) (ReVelle and Hogan, 1989b). Backup and probabilistic
versions of the Facility Location, Equipment-Emplacement Technique (FLEET) are pre-
sented by Schilling et al. (1979). ReVelle (1989) provides a review of the formulations
previously mentioned. Based on the PLSCP, Ball and Lin (1993) proposed the REL-P
formulation, a binary integer programming problem where the stochasticity of the EMS
allocation is more explicitly handled.
The second approach employs the unavailability of the facilities as a weighting fac-
tor in the objective function. Daskin (1982, 1983) formulated and solved the Maximum
Expected Covering Location Problem (MEXCLP), an extension of the MCLP. Assuming
the reliability of the facilities in service follow a binomial distribution, the problem seeks
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to maximize the expected value of demand coverage. Batta et al. (1989) revisited the
MEXCLP and proposed the Adjusted MEXCLP (AMEXCLP) in order to relax some of
the assumptions regarding the independence of busy probabilities. Repede and Bernardo
(1994) presented a MEXCLP with time variation (TIMEXCLP). MEXCLP and proba-
bilistic concepts were applied as well to the FLEET model by Bianchi and Church (1988),
ReVelle and Marianov (1991) and Marianov and ReVelle (1992).
Multiple, excess, backup, and expected coverage, and the relation between them, are
reviewed by Daskin et al. (1988). Li et al. (2011) provide a review of the LSCP, MCLP,
DSM, MEXCLP and MALP, as well as extensions and optimization techniques.
2.2.3 PMP: Redundant Coverage and Unavailability Formulations
Initial considerations regarding facility unavailability in median problems were pre-
sented by Berman and Larson (1982). The problem was approached from a queuing point
of view. The probability that all facilities are busy is added as a weighting term to modify
the traditional PMP objective. Work regarding the availability of individual facilities in
the PMP was presented by Drezner (1987) (Unreliable PMP). The probability that a given
facility r was active, given that the r ´ 1 closest facilities were not, was included as a
weighting factor in the objective function. Heuristic solution methods for the Unreliable
PMP were proposed and tested by Lee (2001). Weaver and Church (1985) and Pirkul
(1989) presented extensions to the PMP and the Uncapacitated Fixed-Charge Location
Problem (UFLP), where customers demands are satisfied by multiple facilities providing
fixed partial coverage. The UFLP is a variation of the PMP where the number of facilities
is a decision variable, not a constraint.
Drezner’s approach has been extended to explicitly include the probability of facility
failure (Krass et al., 2003; Menezes et al., 2003a,b; Snyder, 2003; Snyder and Daskin,
2002, 2003, 2005). In this work, we build from the previous work of Snyder and Daskin
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(2005), which proposed and tested the Reliability PMP (RPMP) and the Reliability Fixed-
Charge Location Problem (RFLP). The RFLP is the unavailability version of the UFLP.
Unlike the UPMP, the RPMP explicitly considers the unavailability of each facility by
making use of the binomial assumption proposed by Daskin (1982, 1983). The concept
of backup facilities was also integrated into the formulation; customers are assigned to
backup facilities when closer facilities have failed. An optimal Lagrangian relaxation
algorithm was proposed to solve both problems.
The binomial distribution allows for the assignment of an individual unavailability
probability to each facility, but assumes that all of them are equal. Later work has been
focused mainly on relaxing this assumption via nonlinear formulations (Berman et al.,
2007; Berry et al., 2009a; Cui et al., 2010; Shen et al., 2011). In the context of facility
location, Berman et al. (2007) presented the Median Problem with Unreliable Facilities
(MPUF) along with a discussion of nodal optimality and asymptotic results for this prob-
lem. Cui et al. (2010) developed the Reliable Uncapacitated Fixed Charge Location Prob-
lem (RUFL). This formulation was linearized into the LRUFL and solved via a Lagrangian
relaxation algorithm. Furthermore, a Continuum Approximation (CA) model was devel-
oped and tested for large instances of the problem. Extensions to the RFLP have been
proposed as well (Lim et al., 2010; Shen et al., 2011). Reviews on supply chain disruption
and unavailability, including PMP extensions, are provided by Snyder and Daskin (2007)
and Snyder et al. (2010). Berry et al. (2009a) extended the idea of imperfect detectors into
water networks. A nonlinear formulation, impSP, along with six solution strategies were
proposed and tested. Further discussion of the work by Berry et al. (2009a) and Berman
et al. (2007) is presented in Section 7.
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3. MIXED-INTEGER LINEAR PROGRAMMING FORMULATION INCLUDING
UNAVAILABILITY (SP-U) *
Previous work in the gas detector placement problem (Legg et al., 2012a,b; Legg, 2013;
Legg et al., 2013) did not considered a key feature associated with gas detector equipment:
The possibility of detection failure. Gas detectors are prone to a number of failure modes
that include failure to function on demand and no output signal. Additionally, due to main-
tainability considerations, gas detectors can be be o✏ine due to preventive maintenance
and testing, or absence due to repairs or replacement. In this section, we extend our initial
formulation (SP) to include these considerations. An MILP formulation is presented in
the next section. This formulation, SP-U, explicitly accounts for the possibility that the
detectors are not able to perform the intended function when service is demanded. This is
achieved by including the concept of detection levels and detector unavailability. Formu-
lation SP-U is based on the Reliability P-Median Problem (RPMP) proposed by Snyder
and Daskin (2005) for facility location models. Results for the proposed formulation are
presented and discussed in Section 3.2, and they are compared with those previously ob-
tained by Legg et al. (2012a,b); Legg (2013); Legg et al. (2013). The explicit treatment of
unavailability in the formulation results in changes to the optimal detector placement. The
possibility of false negative cases is a common concern in the industry, and this modifica-
tion constitutes a step forward in the realism of the problem formulation. This work can
be found in the papers by Benavides-Serrano et al. (2012) and Benavides-Serrano et al.
(2014). Section 3.3 provides a summary of the section.
* Part of this section is reprinted with permission from ”A Stochastic Programming Approach for the
Optimal Placement of Gas Detectors: Unavailability and Voting Strategies” by Benavides-Serrano, A.
J., Legg S. W., Va´zquez-Roma´n R., Mannan, M. S., and Laird C. D., 2014. Industrial & Engineering
Chemistry Research, Copyright 2013 by American Chemical Society. ACS Articles on Request author-
directed link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1021/ie401369v.
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3.1 SP-U Formulation
The RPMP extended the PMP formulation by taking into account the probability that a
small distributor will occasionally defect from the company or go out of business, thereby
requiring a shift in facility assignment. In an analogous way, our formulation incorporates
the probability that a detector will not be able to perform its intended function, i.e., the
detector unavailability. It is important to keep in mind that since the dynamic behavior of
the detector unavailability is not incorporated, the pertinent unavailability values to use in
the formulation are the time-averaged values (q¯). Since detectors are prone to failure, the
primary detector may fail, requiring a second detector to signal detection. The same con-
cept applies for higher coverage levels. If we assume that the time-averaged unavailability,
q¯, of all detectors is the same, the probability that the detector in a given detection level
is responsible for signaling will follow a binomial distribution. That is, it will follow the
discrete probability distribution of the number of failures (r in our case) in a sequence of
Bernoulli trials. This corresponds to the failure of detectors in the first r levels, followed
a successful detection in the next level. The probability mass function for the binomial
distribution is presented in Equation 3.1.
w1pr, q¯q “ q¯rp1´ q¯q (3.1)
The MILP formulation (SP-U) is presented below. Notation for the formulation is
provided in Table A.1. The Pyomo model file containing formulation SP-U is presented in
Appendix G.
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ÿ
aPA
↵a
ÿ
iPLa
ÿ
rPRa,i
da,iw1pr, q¯qxa,i,r (3.2a)
s.t.ÿ
iPLa
xa,i,r “ 1 @ a P A, r P R (3.2b)
ÿ
lPL
sl § p (3.2c)ÿ
rPRa,i
xa,i,r § si @ a P A, i P LazDa (3.2d)
sl P t0, 1u @ l P L (3.2e)
0 § xa,i,r § 1 @ a P A, i P La, r P Ra,i (3.2f)
The problem has two sets of decision variables: sl and xa,i,r. The first one, sl, indicates
if a detector is allocated at location l (sl“1, and 0 otherwise). The second, xa,i,r, indicates
that scenario a is detected at coverage level r by location i (xa,i,r“1, and 0 otherwise).
Formulation SP-U and its extensions could accommodate co-location e↵ects (i.e., multiple
detectors in the same candidate detector location) by allowing sl to take any non-negative
integer value. However, for the results presented in this work, it is going to be assumed that
only one detector is allowed per candidate detector location. The damage coe cient, da,i,
corresponds to the consequence associated with scenario a prior to its detection at location
i. The coverage level r indicates the detection sequence. For example, consider the case
where the damage coe cients correspond to detection time. If a detector is selected at
location i, and it is the first to encounter scenario a, this detector is assigned coverage level
0. The second selected detector to encounter scenario a is assigned coverage level 1, and so
forth. Three sets are defined for the problem: the set L of N potential detector locations, the
set A of M potential hazardous scenarios and the set R of C coverage levels. The number
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of coverage levels can never be larger than the number of detectors. Ideally, to ensure all
potential coverage levels are included, the formulation should consider as many coverage
levels as there are detectors. However, as indicated by Snyder and Daskin (2005), when
the time-averaged unavailability is reasonably low, the probabilities associated with higher
coverage levels quickly tend to zero, there is often no need to consider more than a few
levels. In this work, we considered 5 coverage levels (C“4). Validation of the previous
statement for our data sets, and justification of the number of coverage levels chosen, is
presented in Section 6. Sets La and Da are defined for each scenario. The sets La are
defined as the list of locations that are able to detect scenario a. To account for scenarios
that go undetected, dummy variables are added to xa,i,r with damage coe cient values
that penalize any undetected leak scenarios. The sets Da contain indices corresponding
to these dummy variables. Enough dummy variables are added to allow for detection
failure of each scenario at all the coverage levels. In spirit, these are similar to dummy
detector locations that are always selected. Finally, subsets Ra,i are defined for each pair
of scenario a and location i. These correspond to the set of backup levels in R that location
i can occupy given its associated damage coe cient da,i, where the initial detection level
is 0, the second is 1, and so on. For the results presented, the dummy damage coe cient
(dmax) was set to be 10 seconds greater than the largest damage coe cient for the data set.
The maximum number of detectors that can be allocated is given by p. The probability of
a given scenario a is represented by ↵a. The value of q¯ corresponds to the time-averaged
unavailability of the given type of detector, i.e., the probability that the detector will not
perform the intended function when needed.
The objective function (3.2a) minimizes the expected value of the overall damage co-
e cient considering the probability of failed detection. The product of the damage coef-
ficient da,i and the probability of scenario ↵a would result in a measure of risk. The first
constraint (7.2b) guarantees that every scenario a is detected by a detector at each coverage
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level in R (where the addition of dummy variables relaxes this constraint). Equation (7.2c)
limits the number of detectors that can be deployed. Equation (7.2d) links the existence of
a detector to the coverage levels for a given scenario a. Implicitly, this constraint serves
two purposes. First, it requires that a given scenario a can be counted as detected by one,
and only one, coverage level r for a particular detector location. Secondly, the constraint
ensures that location i can only be the first to detect leak scenario a at coverage level r if
there is a detector placed at location i. The objective function guarantees that, for each
scenario a, the detector assigned to the coverage level r will always be a detector with
a smaller damage coe cient than the detector assigned to coverage level r ` 1. In this
way, the objective function guarantees that the detectors are assigned coverage levels in a
sequence of increasing damage coe cients. In our formulation constraint (7.2d) replaces
two constrains from the formulation of Snyder and Daskin (2005) (equations 3 and 5 in
the RPMP formulation). Constraint (7.2d) serves the same purpose but improves memory
usage and solution times.
In the RPMP model proposed by Snyder and Daskin, a term in the objective func-
tion accounts for those facilities loyal to the firm, i.e., those that will not fail to supply
their services to the firm under any circumstances. Their formulation also allows for the
possibility of opening a non-failable emergency facility in the case that no facilities are
available to serve the costumer. The addition of such a facility may result in a penalty such
as a low sales cost or a cost of purchasing product from a competitor. In the detector layout
problem, the detectors used are all susceptible to failure, and the concept of a non-failable
location is not applicable. Therefore, these parts of the formulation were removed.
3.2 Numerical Results
In this section, results for the SP-U formulation for di↵erent time-averaged unavail-
ability values (0, 0.1 and 0.2) are compared. These correspond to representative values of
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the real gas detector unavailabilities in the process industries (see Section 1.3.2). Results
were generated using data set A previously presented in Section 1.3.1. This corresponds to
the same data employed by Legg et al. (2012a,b); Legg (2013); Legg et al. (2013). For this
data set, a typical instance of the formulation has 26792 variables and 6195 constraints.
The time to solution was in all cases less than 10 seconds. Five coverage levels (C“4)
were used for all the results reported. The expected time to detection results account for
the low probability event that 5 detection levels are all present but each fails to detect the
event. That is, dmax p1´∞rPR w1pr, q¯qq was added to the final objective function value.
A leak scenario was considered detected at a given detector location when the simu-
lated gas cloud reached a concentration greater than 10% of the Lower Flammability Limit
(LFL) value. Detection times for each of these scenarios and locations were recorded, and
these times were used as the damage coe cients, da,i, resulting in problem formulations
that seek to minimize the expected time to detection across all the scenarios. Ideally, the
objective function to minimize should be the overall risk to the facility. This can be easily
accommodated into our formulations by using da,i as maximum risk incurred for scenario
a prior to detection at location i. A significant amount of data is necessary to compute the
consolidated risk to the facility. Given the data available for our analysis, the performance
metric used in this work, our previous work (Legg et al., 2012a,b; Legg, 2013; Legg et al.,
2013) considers the minimization of the expected detection time over all gas leak scenar-
ios as the objective function. This approach is in accordance to the principal objective of
gas detection systems. Although the evaluation of the risk reduction capability of the gas
detection systems is the exception rather than the norm, it is possible to find wide agree-
ment regarding the principal objective of the gas detection system: to provide fast and
reliable detection of gas accumulations before they reach concentration and sizes which
could pose a risk to the facility and it’s occupants. That is, identifying accidental releases
as fast as possible, so that proper countermeasures can be initiated (International Elec-
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trotechnical Commission (IEC), 2007; International Society of Automation (ISA), 2010;
Norsk Sokkels Konkuranseposisjon (NORSOK), 2008). This point of view is shared by
recent performance analyses where gas detection systems e↵ectiveness is commonly eval-
uated in terms of time to and probability of detection Bratteteig et al. (2011); Kelsey et al.
(2002, 2005). As previously mentioned, gas detection systems have interfaces with several
other safety systems. These include the Emergency Shut Down (ESD), Blow Down (BD),
Ignition Source Control (ISC), ventilation, Public Address (PA) and alarms system, and
fire fighting systems (Norsk Sokkels Konkuranseposisjon (NORSOK), 2008). Minimizing
the time to detection and guaranteeing reliable detection allows for e↵ective corrective ac-
tions and emergency response, including ignition source control, containment, evacuation
of personnel, or other actions appropriate to the specific situation.
The same probability of occurrence, ↵a “ 1{M, was utilized for each dispersion sce-
nario a in a given data set; M corresponds to the number of scenarios in the respective
data set. Expert advice, databases or more rigorous approaches like Layer Of Protection
Analysis (LOPA) and Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) should be used to obtain these
scenario probabilities in real world applications.
The e↵ect of the increasing number of detectors on the expected time to detection and
the fraction of scenarios covered is presented in Figure 3.1. The fraction of scenarios
covered represents the fraction of scenarios that have at least one of the selected detector
locations in subset La (excluding the dummy locations). With q¯“0, the SP-U formulation
is equivalent to the initial SP formulation, yielding the same results presented in Legg et al.
(2012a,b); Legg (2013).
As expected, when detector layouts with the same number of detectors and di↵erent
time-averaged unavailability are compared, the layout with the smallest unavailability will
have the lowest objective. An increase in the unavailability will result in an increased
weighting of the backup coverage levels, which are associated with larger damage.
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Figure 3.1: SP-U formulation results: Expected detection time (‚, N and ⌅) and fraction
of leak scenarios covered (˝, 4 and ⇤) as a function of the maximum number of allowed
detectors, p.
An overhead view of the optimal placement of 25 detectors using the SP, SP-U with
q¯“0.1 and SP-U with q¯“0.2 formulations is presented in Figure 3.2. Only 19 of the
25 detectors placed by the q¯“0 case are used by the q¯“0.1 case. Likewise, 15 of them
are part of the solution of the q¯“0.2 case. Furthermore, the results of the q¯“0.1 and
q¯“0.2 cases share 16 detector locations. This shows that consideration of unavailability
in the formulation alters the final detector placement. For this problem, all scenarios were
detected when the number of detectors was greater than or equal to 24, 25, and 27 for q¯“0,
q¯“0.1, and q¯“0.2 respectively. This indicates that for our data set, and by means of our
formulation, there will be little loss of overall scenario coverage due to the necessity of
providing redundant coverage.
To assess the true value of considering detector unavailability in the optimization for-
mulation, the di↵erences between the optimal SP-U solution and the value of the SP-U
objective calculated with the solution placement from the SP formulation of Legg et al.
(2012a); Legg (2013) are reported in Figure 3.3. Expected time to detection values are
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Figure 3.2: SP-U formulation results: Detector locations in the process facility, p“25.
Potential detector locations are represented by `, ˝ represent the detectors placed by the
q¯“0 case (SP formulation), 4 represent the detectors placed by the q¯“0.1 case, and ⇤
represent the detectors placed by the q¯“0.2 case.
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Figure 3.3: Comparison showing the value of SP-U formulation. This figure shows the
expected time to detection from the placements produced by SP when unavailability is
considered. This metric is displayed as percent di↵erence from the SP-U results. Expected
detection times for q¯“0.1 and q¯“0.2 are shown as N and ⌅, respectively.
presented as percentage di↵erences between the optimal SP-U (q¯“0.1 and q¯“0.2) solu-
tion, and the value of the SP-U objective calculated with the solution placement from the
SP formulation (q¯“0). Initially, for a low number of detectors, both the SP and SP-U
formulations will result in similar placements. The e↵ect of relaxing the assumption of
perfect detectors becomes more noticeable as the number of detectors are increased. Note
that the SP formulation makes no additional improvement in its objective for p ° 72. Past
this point the SP formulation will not benefit from the allocation of more detectors, while
the SP-U formulation will continue to benefit from the allocation of new detectors by pro-
viding additional backup coverage. When 100 detectors are allocated, the expected time
to detection is 28% higher for the q¯“0.1 case and 57% higher for the q¯“0.2 case. This
figure shows that it is important to consider detector unavailability when performing the
optimal placement.
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3.3 Summary
An extension of a previously developed MILP approach for optimal gas detector place-
ment was presented. Extension (SP-U) considers the e↵ect of the detector not being able
to perform its intended function by including the concept of detection levels and detector
unavailability. This formulation guarantees that the increase in the expected time to de-
tection due to false negative (non-detection) cases is minimal. For our case study there
is little loss of overall scenario coverage when considering unavailability. However, the
optimal placements are a↵ected. Furthermore, if we neglect detector unavailability when
optimizing the layout, and then use this layout in a real setting where unavailability ex-
ists, the actual expected time to detection is significantly deteriorated. The work presented
here constitutes a step forward toward the achievement of a realistic detector placement
formulation that includes current industrial practice for these important safety systems.
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4. MIXED-INTEGER LINEAR PROGRAMMING FORMULATION INCLUDING
UNAVAILABILITY AND VOTING EFFECTS (SP-UV) *
Previous work (Legg et al., 2012a,b; Legg, 2013; Legg et al., 2013) in the gas detector
placement problem did not consider the common operating requirement for voting logic.
In reality gas sensors are prone to false positives. The solution usually implemented in the
process industries to tackle this issue is to require additional confirmation from several de-
tectors before emergency actions are triggered. This additional confirmation requirement
is known as voting. A discussion regarding voting logic schemes was presented in Section
1. In this section, we extend our previous formulation (SP-U) to include these consider-
ations. An MILP formulation is presented in the next section. This formulation, SP-UV,
generalizes SP-U by making use of the negative binomial distribution in order to take the
voting logic e↵ects into account. Results for the proposed formulation are presented and
discussed in Section 4.2, and they are compared with those previously obtained by Legg
et al. (2012a,b); Legg (2013); Legg et al. (2013) and in the previous section for formulation
SP-U. When a voting policy for the detection and mitigation system is in place, explicitly
including voting logic considerations result in changes to the optimal detector placement
and significant improvements in the expected time to detection. This work can be found
in the paper by Benavides-Serrano et al. (2014). Section 4.3 provides a summary of the
section.
* Part of this section is reprinted with permission from ”A Stochastic Programming Approach for the
Optimal Placement of Gas Detectors: Unavailability and Voting Strategies” by Benavides-Serrano, A.
J., Legg S. W., Va´zquez-Roma´n R., Mannan, M. S., and Laird C. D., 2014. Industrial & Engineering
Chemistry Research, Copyright 2013 by American Chemical Society. ACS Articles on Request author-
directed link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1021/ie401369v.
Part of this section is reprinted with permission from “A Quantitative Assessment on the Placement
Practices of Gas Detectors in the Process Industries” by Benavides-Serrano A. J., Mannan, M. S, and
Laird C. D., 2014. To appear in the Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries.
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4.1 SP-UV Formulation
Formulation SP-U is now extended to reflect the characteristics of a voting logic, i.e.,
requiring confirmation by k detectors before the existence of a gas leak is acknowledged.
As before, the objective function (4.2a) seeks to minimize the expected value of the over-
all damage considering the probability of failed detection. Once again, since the dynamic
behavior of the detector unavailability is not incorporated, the pertinent unavailability val-
ues to use in the formulation are the time-averaged values (q¯). However, this formulation
takes into account that k detectors must confirm the leak existence before action is taken.
By incorporating this confirmation requirement, and assuming that the time-averaged un-
availability of all detectors is the same, the probability that the detector in a given detection
level will be responsible for signaling can be modeled by using a negative binomial dis-
tribution. That is, it can be modeled by the discrete probability distribution of the number
of failures (r in our case) in a sequence of Bernoulli trials before a specified non-random
number of successes (denoted k) occur. The probability mass function for the negative
binomial distribution is presented in Equation 4.1).
w2pr, k, q¯q “
ˆ
r ` k ´ 1
r
˙
q¯rp1´ q¯qk (4.1)
The MILP model proposed (SP-UV) is presented below. Notation for the formula-
tion is provided in Table A.1. The Pyomo model file containing formulation SP-UV is
presented in Appendix H.
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min
ÿ
aPA
↵a
ÿ
iPLa
ÿ
rPRa,i
da,iw2pr, k, q¯qxa,i,r`k´1 (4.2a)
s.t.ÿ
iPLa
xa,i,r “ 1 @a P A, r P R (4.2b)
ÿ
lPL
sl § p (4.2c)ÿ
iPLa
da,ixa,i,r §
ÿ
iPLa
da,ixa,i,r`1 @a P A, tr|r P R, r § k ´ 1u (4.2d)
ÿ
rPRa,i
xa,i,r § si @a P A, i P LazDa (4.2e)
sl P t0, 1u @l P L (4.2f)
0 § xa,i,r § 1 @a P A, i P La, tr|r P Ra,i, r • ku (4.2g)
xa,i,r P t0, 1u @a P A, i P La, tr|r P Ra,i, r † ku (4.2h)
Equations 4.2b-4.2c and 4.2e-4.2g are equivalent to those in the SP-U formulation.
Two issues arise since the first k detection levels are no longer part of the objective func-
tion. First, the proper order of detection levels is no longer guaranteed (since the corre-
sponding damage coe cient no longer appears in the objective), and an additional con-
straint (4.2d) was added to fulfill this requirement. Furthermore, there is no longer a guar-
antee that the continuous variables xa,i,r will converge to integer values, therefore, these
variables are constrained to be 0´1 in (4.2h).
4.2 Numerical Results
In this section, results for the SP-UV formulation with q¯“0.1 and two di↵erent voting
strategies (k“1 and k“2) are presented. These correspond to a representative value of
the real gas detector unavailability and two of the most used voting policies in the pro-
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cess industries, respectively. Refer to Section 1 for a discussion on the reasoning behind
these values. Results were generated using data set A previously presented in 1.3.1. This
corresponds to the same data employed by Benavides-Serrano et al. (2014); Legg et al.
(2012a,b); Legg (2013); Legg et al. (2013). Damage coe cients and scenario probabili-
ties were calculated following the same considerations presented in Section 3.2.
For this data set, a typical instance of the formulation has 26792 variables and 6517
constraints. With respect to SP-U, the number of variables remains the same, while Equa-
tion (4.2d) added 322 constraints. Depending on the number of detectors allowed, the time
to solution varied from a few minutes to a couple of days. Five coverage levels (C“4) were
used for all the results reported. The expected time to detection results account for the low
probability event that 5 detection levels are all present but each fails to detect the event.
That is, dmax p1´∞rPR w2pr, k, q¯qq was added to the final objective function value.
The e↵ect of the increasing number of detectors on the expected time to detection and
the fraction of scenarios covered is presented in Figure 4.1. The fraction of scenarios
covered represents the fraction of scenarios that have at least k of the selected detector
locations in La (excluding the dummy locations). The SP-UV formulation with k“1 is
equivalent to the SP-U formulation, and yields the same results presented in Figure 3.1.
As anticipated, for detector layouts with the same number of detectors and probabilities
of failure but di↵erent voting strategies, the case with the simpler voting logic, i.e. lower
k, will have an smaller expected time to detection. Due to the redundancy requirement
added by the SP-UV formulation, k detector locations must confirm the existence of a gas
leak before an action is initiated. Therefore, the lowest achievable detection time for a
scenario is that given by the k-th detector. Since more detectors are required before a leak
scenario triggers an action, there is an increased likelihood of undetected scenarios for
a given detector budget. For detector layouts with the same number of detectors, equal
probabilities of failure, and di↵erent voting strategies, the placements corresponding to
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Figure 4.1: SP-UV formulation results: Expected detection time (N, _) and fraction of
leak scenarios covered twice (4, ˛) as a function of the maximum number of allowed
detectors, p.
simpler voting logic will always have an equal or larger fraction of scenarios detected.
Again, this is an expected consequence of the redundant confirmation requirement.
For the data set, the minimum number of detectors required in order to cover all of
the scenarios for a 2-o-o-p voting logic is 59, which corresponds to an expected time to
detection of 62 seconds. One might expect that the number of detectors required to cover
all scenarios for the k“2 case would double, or close to double, that of the number of
detectors required to cover each scenario for the k“1 case. However, the objective function
in this case is to minimize the expected time to detection, not to maximize coverage, and
the formulation may prioritize additional backup levels on high impact scenarios over
coverage of all scenarios, meaning more than double the number of detectors may be
required. Figure 4.2 presents an overhead view comparison between the optimal placement
of 59 detectors using the SP, SP-U and SP-UV formulations. The number of optimal
locations shared by the SP and SP-UV (q¯“0.1, k“2) formulations is 18. For the SP-U
(q¯“0.1, k“1) and SP-UV (q¯“0.1, k“2) formulations the number of shared locations is 28.
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Figure 4.2: SP-UV formulation results: Detector locations in the process facility, p“59.
Potential detector locations are represented by `, ˝ represent the detectors placed by the
SP formulation, 4 represent the detectors placed by the SP-U formulation with q¯“0.1, and
˛ represent the detectors placed by the SP-UV formulation with q¯“0.1 and k“2.
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Figure 4.3: Comparison showing the value of SP-UV formulation. This figure shows the
expected time to detection and fraction of covered scenarios from the placements produced
by SP and SP-U when unavailability and voting is considered. These metrics are displayed
as percent di↵erences from the SP-UV results. Expected detection times for SP and SP-U
are shown as ⌅ and N respectively. Fraction of leak scenarios covered twice for SP and
SP-U are shown with ⇤ and 4 respectively.
These correspond to di↵erences in 70% and 53% of the allocated detectors, respectively.
It is clear that considering the e↵ect of voting strategies substantially changes the detector
placement.
Actual process facilities regularly require voting strategies. However, formulation SP-
UV is significantly more complex and computationally demanding than SP and SP-U. To
asses the true benefit of the SP-UV formulation, we compare the optimal expected time
to detection from SP-UV with the expected time to detection that arises if we determine
optimal placements using the original SP formulation of Legg et al. (2012a) and SP-U
formulation, but evaluate those placements considering unavailability and voting (using
the objective from SP-UV). The same time-averaged detector unavailability (q¯“0.1) was
used for the SP-U and SP-UV cases. The resulting di↵erences in the expected time to
detection and the fraction of scenarios covered between the optimal SP-UV solution and
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the evaluation of the solutions from SP and SP-U on the SP-UV objective are reported in
Figure 4.3. The expected time to detection di↵erences are presented as a percentage of the
optimal expected time to detection obtained with the SP-UV formulation. Di↵erences in
the fraction of scenarios covered are presented as a percentage of the fraction of scenarios
covered obtained with the SP-UV formulation.
When the SP results are evaluated using a 2-o-o-p voting logic, the e↵ects of not
considering unavailability and voting explicitly become evident. As shown in Figure 4.3,
the di↵erence in the fraction of scenarios detected for the SP formulation is considerable.
For our data set, for a number of detectors equal to 100, one out of ten scenarios will remain
uncovered. This is again due to the fact that for the SP formulation, further addition of
detectors past 72 will provide no improvement in the expected detection time. Due to this
same reason, the expected time to detection follows the same pattern as Figure 3.3. Above
72 detectors the di↵erence will again grow steadily. When 100 detectors are allocated, the
expected time to detection arising from the SP placement is already 228% higher than that
arising from the SP-UV placement.
When the single voting logic (1-o-o-p) results are evaluated using a 2-o-o-p voting
logic, the di↵erence between the fractions of scenarios covered will be considerable when
few detectors are placed since formulation SP-UV favors backup coverage of high impact
scenarios. However, for some placement results with a number of detectors ranging from
50 to 60, the di↵erence will actually be negative (never less than -1%). This is again at-
tributed to the fact that the SP-UV formulation prioritizes the placement of detectors to
provide additional backup coverage of high impact scenarios. For the SP-U formulation,
the curve for the time di↵erence results increases initially and then decreases. Initially, the
SP-U formulation will preferentially provide a primary coverage level of the scenarios.
But, when the amount of detectors is su ciently larger, detectors will be preferentially
employed as backup coverage on high impact scenarios. At this point, SP-U and the SP-
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UV formulations are both essentially improving the second coverage level. Because both
formulations now share a similar goal, the di↵erence in the expected time to detection
between both solutions begins declining. However, this correction is not su cient for
formulation SP-U to provide answers that are close to the optimal answer obtained by us-
ing formulation SP-UV. This figure shows the importance of explicitly considering voting
policies when performing the optimal placement.
On a final note, it is important to acknowledge the increase in the computational e↵ort
arising from the explicit consideration of voting into the formulation. Given the numerical
results, this additional computational e↵ort can be easily justified. First, this is a design
problem and the solution time is negligible when compared to the amount of time already
invested at this point in the detection and mitigation system design, the dispersion simula-
tions assessment, and the simulations. Finally, the amount of economic losses for which
these detection and mitigation systems are developed, and the cost of the system itself,
easily exceed the cost of the additional computational e↵ort required.
4.3 Summary
An extension of the previously developed SP-U formulation for optimal gas detec-
tor placement was presented. Formulation SP-UV extends SP-U to incorporate a voting
scheme that explicitly requires k detectors to confirm the gas leak existence before actions
are initiated. Voting logic shields the system against false alarms. As with the previous
formulation, the optimal layouts from SP-UV di↵ered significantly from those obtained
with SP and SP-U. Neglecting the voting strategies in the optimization, that is, optimizing
with SP or SP-U and applying that layout in a real setting with voting, causes a signifi-
cant decrease in performance. These results clearly indicate the importance of explicitly
including the detection and mitigation system voting policies into our formulations. Fur-
thermore, while formulation SP-UV originates from the need of including detection and
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mitigation system voting, it is application can be easily extended by analogy to other fa-
cility siting problems in the operations research literature.
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5. QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT AGAINST CURRENT GAS DETECTOR
PLACEMENT PRACTICES IN THE PROCESS INDUSTRIES *
As introduced in Section 1.2, most detector placement strategies for gas detection
systems are prescriptive approaches supported by qualitative considerations and rules of
thumb rather than quantitative metrics based on the dispersion behavior of the possible
leak scenarios. The work presented by Legg et al. (2012a,b, 2013) and Benavides-Serrano
et al. (2014), and summarized in Sections 2-4, proposed, developed, and validated the use
of stochastic programming formulations in order to take further advantage of the quantita-
tive information provided by dispersion simulations. These formulations identify the gas
detector layout that minimizes the expected value of the overall damage (i.e., the mini-
mization of a risk metric) given a set of dispersion scenarios. Results demonstrated the
potential and suitability of numerical optimization to approach the gas detector placement
problem while rigorously considering its inherent uncertainties.
Motivated by this evidence, this section strives to answer the following questions: Are
current practices e↵ective at designing gas detection systems? What is the value of dis-
persion data and numerical optimization techniques in terms of detection system perfor-
mance? The rest of this section is organized as follows. In Section 5.1 we describe our
assumptions, and develop implementations of the placement approaches described in Sec-
tion 1.2. Each of the approaches in Section 5.1 is then applied to the generated data sets.
Their performance is presented and analyzed in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 provides general
conclusions and a summary of the section.
* Part of this section is reprinted with permission from “A Quantitative Assessment on the Placement
Practices of Gas Detectors in the Process Industries” by Benavides-Serrano A. J., Mannan, M. S, and
Laird C. D., 2014. Submitted to the Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries.
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5.1 Models
For this work, four existing approaches for gas detector placement were implemented
and compared with two quantitative optimization-based approaches. The approaches were
selected based on their wide use in the process industry. As well, it was intended to in-
clude a broad range of qualitative/semi-quantitative approaches and methodologies being
currently used. The four existing approaches studied were the Random Approach (RA),
the Volumetric Approach (VA), the Minimum Source Distance Problem (MSDP), i.e., the
minimization of the distance between the detectors and the leak sources, and a Greedy
Coverage (GC) approach. These approaches were compared against the previously pre-
sented stochastic programming formulation considering unavailability and voting e↵ects
(SP-UV, Benavides-Serrano et al. (2014), Section 4). Additionally, a second mathemati-
cal programming formulation, the Maximum Coverage Location Problem (MCLP, Church
and ReVelle (1974)), is proposed for comparison purposes. A discussion regarding the al-
gorithms, their technical basis, and challenges is provided in the subsections below. Table
A.1 summarizes the data requirements and notation used in each algorithm. For compari-
son and accountability reasons, equivalent notation was used.
5.1.1 Random Approach (RA)
The RA corresponds to the simplest possible approach for the layout of gas detectors,
it only requires the specification of the set L of N candidate detector locations. This al-
gorithm has minimal data requirements since detectors are placed randomly in candidate
locations. The algorithm was run 1000 times, and mean values of the performance metrics
are reported.
Is not uncommon to encounter sites were no study or analysis is performed to sup-
plement the placement of gas detectors. Due to the lack of a placement strategy, it can
be expected that the results obtained by this method will underperform those of the other
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algorithms and formulations presented in this section. This will provide an expected lower
bound for the performance of the other approaches presented, and will help to answer a
number of questions: Are other approaches better than a placement performed without
any information? If they are, how much better are they? What is the value of the added
information?
5.1.2 Volumetric Approach (VA)
In the volumetric approach, the goal of detector placement is to guarantee that a spher-
ical gas cloud is detected before reaching a predetermined diameter. The number of gas
detectors is determined based on the facility’s volume, and the placement is carried out
following a regular or staggered grid pattern. As with the RA, this algorithm only requires
the specification of the set L of N candidate detector locations.
The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) (1993) outlines the theoretical background be-
hind this approach. For confined volumes with blockage ratios up to 0.4, the point ignition
of a flammable stoichiometric hydrocarbon cloud (methane or propane) will not achieve
speeds greater than 125 m/sec if the acceleration distance is less than 6 m. The blockage
ratio is defined as the fraction of the volume occupied by congestion elements (i.e. equip-
ment, pipework, etc) to the plant volume under consideration. The resulting overpressures
would be less than the threshold for major structural damage (150 mbar), reducing the
structural risk to the facility. Based on this evidence, the placement of flammable gas
detectors at 5 m intervals was established as a rule of thumb for o↵shore platforms (Oil
& Gas UK (UKOOA), 1995). To date, this approach remains common practice for the
determination of appropriate gas detection and placement criteria (International Society of
Automation (ISA), 2010). Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) (2009) describes
the typical use in the process industries. The determination of the diameter to detect is
based on the type and size of the space to be monitored: 4 m for small ventilated build-
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ings, 5 m for other fully enclosed structures with volumes greater than 1, 000 m3 (if they
have an inerting system in place), and 5 m for partially enclosed volumes greater than
1, 000 m3, if their blockage ratios are greater than 0.3. Partially enclosed and open vol-
umes with blockage ratios under 0.3 should be analyze in a case by case basis, but usually
will not require gas detection unless congested areas are present.
The gas detector placement was performed following Center for Chemical Process
Safety (CCPS) (2009) guidelines. Our data sets correspond to partially enclosed volumes
with volumes greater than 1, 000 m3, and blockage ratios greater than 0.3. Therefore, the
chosen detector spacing was 5m. The common practice for lighter than air gases is to use
a single layer of detectors on an approximate 5m by 5m grid, close to the ceiling of the
module. Therefore, for each of the models a base case was implemented where a single
5m by 5m grid layer of detectors was placed in the ceiling of the monitored module. This
was used as a base case. When the height of the modules allowed for it, additional case
studies with extra horizontal detector layers were assessed and compared.
5.1.3 Minimum Source Distance Problem (MSDP)
The placement of detectors near leak sources is a widespread rule of thumb in the pro-
cess industries. The placement strategy behind this practice conjectures that the closer the
detectors are placed to the potential leak sources, the more e↵ective the placement will
be. That is, the objective is to minimize the expected distance from the leak sources to the
detectors. Some sources that explicitly recommend the location of gas detectors close to
potential sources of gas releases include International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC)
(2007), International Society of Automation (ISA) (2003), National Fire Protection Asso-
ciation (NFPA) (2007), and General Monitors (2013). Some of these standards explicitly
suggest prioritizing the placement of gas detectors based on the proximity to the leak
source, e.g. NFPA 15 (Section 6.5.2.7.1) (National Fire Protection Association (NFPA),
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2007).
The required data for the implementation of this approach is minimal, only a set L of
candidate detector locations, and a set S of potential leak source locations are necessary.
While sensors could be manually placed near leak locations, to remove subjectivity when
the number of sensors is smaller than the number of leaks, we implemented an optimal
placement for this objective. This formulation MSDP, is a P-Median Problem (PMP)
(Hakimi, 1965; ReVelle and Swain, 1970) that finds sensor locations that minimize the
sum of distances between leak locations and the nearest detector. The MSDP is equivalent
to formulation SP with a redefined damage coe cient. The damage coe cient definition
is presented below. Notation for the formulation is provided in Table A.1. The Pyomo
model file for formulation MSDP is equivalent to the SP file presented in Appendix F.
The MSDP minimizes the expected distance from the leak sources to the candidate
detector locations (Equation 5.1a) by selecting at most (p) of the candidate detector lo-
cations (Constraint 5.1b). Two decision variables are used. Variable yl indicates if a de-
tector is allocated at location l (yl “ 1, and 0 otherwise). Variable xs,l stipulates if a leak
source location s was considered covered by a detector at location l (xs,l “ 1, and 0 oth-
erwise). Parameter  s,l, corresponds to the Euclidean distance from leak source location
s to candidate detector location l. The probability associated with a given leak location s
is represented by ↵s. Constraint (5.1c) relates the existence of a gas detector at location
l with the coverage of leak source location s at that location. Equation (5.1d) specifies
that leak source location s can only be considered covered by one detector location. This
detector location corresponds to the closest placed detector to the leak source location.
Constraint (5.1e) specifies decision variable xs,l as continuous belonging to the interval
[0,1]. Equation (5.1e) stipulates decision variable yl as binary.
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min
ÿ
sPS
↵s
ÿ
iPL
 s,lxs,l (5.1a)
ÿ
lPL
yl § p (5.1b)
xs,l § yl, @s P S , l P L (5.1c)ÿ
lPL
xs,l “ 1, @ s P S (5.1d)
0 § xs,l § 1, @ s P S , l P L (5.1e)
yl P t0, 1u, @ l P L (5.1f)
5.1.4 Scenario Coverage Approach (GC and MCLP)
Overall scenario coverage has a widespread use as a metric for the placement and eval-
uation of gas detector systems. Common objectives are the achievement of full scenario
coverage with the fewest number of detectors, and the maximization of the overall scenario
coverage given a fixed number of detectors, i.e. a predetermined budget.
Several categories of strategies are employed to achieve these objectives. In the basic
case, detectors are placed according to the team’s assessment of the dispersion patterns
while keeping scenario coverage in mind. The number of detectors is obtained from bud-
get constraints, cost-benefit analyzes, heuristics, standards, regulations, or following the
team’s intuition. For example, API RP 14C (Section C.1.3.2) (American Petroleum Insti-
tute (API), 2001) states: “In enclosed areas containing flammable gas compressors, the
minimum number of sensors is one per compressor unit, plus an additional sensor per
three units or fractional part thereof”. A second set of strategies comprises more sophis-
ticated instances where dispersion simulations are used. For example, ISA-TR84.00.07
(International Society of Automation (ISA), 2010) (Annex A.2, Step 7-11 and Annex B.4)
proposes the use of probabilistic dispersion simulations supplemented by a graphical out-
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put of the scenario coverage. Dispersion scenarios are overlaid on a grid containing in-
formation about the candidate detector locations, and detectors are added until a desired
overall scenario coverage is achieved. The use of scenario dispersion simulations allows
the quantification of the number of scenarios covered by one, two, or more detectors. Re-
sults from these approaches can be verified, and are expected to outperform those of the
more basic strategies. While high quality quantitative data is used in this second set of
strategies, an ad-hoc non-optimal algorithm is used for the detector placement. A third set
of strategies would consider the problem from a formal quantitative perspective in order
to guarantee the best possible placement given the scenario coverage objective.
Two di↵erent placement approaches based on scenario coverage were implemented: A
greedy coverage algorithm (GC) and a Maximum Coverage Location Problem (MCLP).
The data required for both algorithms is the same. Three sets of data are required. The set
L of N potential gas detector locations, the set A of M potential leak scenarios, and sets
La. Sets La are defined for each scenario, and are defined as the list of all locations that
are able to detect scenario a. This corresponds to the data proposed by ISA-TR84.00.07
(International Society of Automation (ISA), 2010) in Step 3. Notation for both approaches
is summarized in Table A.1. The Python file corresponding to the implementation of
algorithm GC is presented in Appendix I. The Pyomo model file for formulation MCLP is
presented in Appendix J.
Algorithm GC places detectors following a simple rule: at each stage, choose the can-
didate detector location that covers the largest number of uncovered leak scenarios. Once
all scenarios are covered once, it continues to add redundancy by selecting the detector
that covers the largest number of uncovered leak scenarios twice, thrice, and so on, until
each scenario is covered k times. With k depending on the voting scheme. Again, this cor-
responds to the coverage algorithm embedded in ISA-TR84.00.07 (International Society
of Automation (ISA), 2010). While this greedy approach is intuitive and straightforward
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to implement, it is not guaranteed to be optimal (e.g., an equivalent coverage may be pos-
sible with fewer detectors, or a higher coverage may be possible using the same number
of detectors).
The MCLP, a mathematical programming formulation, guarantees maximum scenario
coverage given a number of detectors. Initially proposed by (Church and ReVelle, 1974),
the MCLP maximizes the weighted sum of covered scenarios (Equation 5.2a) by select-
ing at most (p) of the candidate locations (Constraint 5.2b), therefore avoiding the sub-
optimality of greedy placement approaches. Two decision variables are used; yl and xa.
The first one, yl, indicates if a detector is allocated at location l (yl “ 1, and 0 otherwise).
The second, xa, indicates if a scenario a was detected (xa “ 1, and 0 otherwise). Finally,
parameter k corresponds to the number of detector confirmations required before emer-
gency actions are triggered, that is, a k-out-of-p voting scheme. Constraint (5.2c) links
the existence of a detector impacting scenario a to it’s detection by requiring that k detec-
tors must confirm the leak existence before the scenario outcome is flagged as covered.
Constraint (5.2d) and (5.2e) specify decision variables xa and yl as binary.
max
ÿ
aPA
xa (5.2a)
ÿ
lPL
yl § p (5.2b)
ÿ
iPLazDa
yi • kxa, @a P A (5.2c)
xa P t0, 1u, @ a P A (5.2d)
yl P t0, 1u, @ l P L (5.2e)
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5.2 Results and Analysis
Results were generated using the four independent data sets and the data generation
procedure previously presented in Section 1.3.1. Three di↵erent performance metrics were
used in accordance to the objectives of gas detection systems, i.e., fraction of covered
scenarios at alarm level, fraction of covered scenarios at action level, and expected time
to detection at action level. Since a 2-out-of-p voting scheme was used for the results
presented, we consider two levels of detection. That is, the alarm level corresponds to the
results when 1 detector confirms detection of the gas leak, while action level corresponds
to the results when 2 detectors confirm detection of the gas leak.
Two di↵erent sets of results are presented for each data set. A first set of results is
presented in Figures 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4. These results were obtained by running the de-
tector placement algorithms over each of the full sets of scenario data and then evaluating
the generated placement using the three metrics mentioned above. A second set of results
are presented in Figures 5.5, 5.6, 5.7, and 5.8. This second set of results were generated in
order to test the resilience of the placement algorithms to unforeseen scenarios due to defi-
ciencies in the scenario generation analysis. Here, the detector placement algorithms were
run over a randomly selected subset of scenarios. In all cases the size of the subset used
to selected the detector locations corresponded to 75% of the total number of dispersion
scenarios. Subsequently, the remaining 25% of the scenarios were used to evaluate the
generated placement via the three selected metrics. Results are analyzed below for each
of the detector placement models. Note that for the RA and VA approaches the placement
for both these sets of results is the same since scenario data is not used when determining
the placement.
For the remaining approaches (MSDP, GC, MCLP, and SP-UV), required parameters
were obtained from the data sets. For GC, MCLP, and SP-UV a given candidate detector
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Figure 5.1: Quantitative comparison: Data set A results. Full set of scenarios
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Figure 5.2: Quantitative comparison: Data set B results. Full set of scenarios
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Figure 5.3: Quantitative comparison: Data set C results. Full set of scenarios
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Figure 5.4: Quantitative comparison: Data set D results. Full set of scenarios
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Figure 5.5: Quantitative comparison: Data set A results. Randomly selected subset of
scenarios
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Figure 5.6: Quantitative comparison: Data set B results. Randomly selected subset of
scenarios
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Figure 5.7: Quantitative comparison: Data set C results. Randomly selected subset of
scenarios
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Figure 5.8: Quantitative comparison: Data set D results. Randomly selected subset of
scenarios
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location (l) was considered to a↵ect a leak scenario (a), and therefore added to set La, if
the simulated gas cloud reached a concentration of the gas greater than 10% of the Lower
Flammability Limit (LFL) value at the candidate detector location. This corresponds to the
detection threshold value at which the gas detectors are set. Additionally, for formulation
SP-UV discussed in Section 4, a damage coe cient da,i was calculated for each location i
that a↵ected a scenario a. The damage coe cient da,i is set to the time between the leak
initiation for scenario a and the detection of that scenario at location i. The dummy dam-
age coe cient (dmax) was set to be 10 seconds greater than the largest damage coe cient
da,i for the given data set. A probability of detector unavailability of q“0.1 was used. A
discussion and data for unavailability calculations in the process industries are presented
by Modarres et al. (2010) and Stiftelsen for industriell og teknisk forskning (SINTEF)
(2002), respectively. Furthermore, two voting policies were assessed, k“1 and k“2. Five
coverage levels were considered for all the results present. The same probability of occur-
rence ↵a “ 1{M was utilized for each dispersion scenario a in a given data set.
5.2.1 RA Results
As mentioned above, it was expected that the RA would underperform all other ap-
proaches. With the exception of the VA, this is true for a low number of detectors for
most of the results presented. However, as the number of detectors increases some of the
detector placement algorithms (MSDP, GC, MCLP (k“1), and MCLP (k“2)) are actually
outperformed by the RA. Once these 4 approaches have all of the leak sources (MSDP) or
scenarios (GC, MCLP (k“1) and MCLP (k“2)) covered, there is no secondary objective
to intelligently place remaining detectors. With k“1, the MCLP approach stops when all
scenarios are covered at alarm level. With k“2, the MCLP and the GC approach stop
when all scenarios are covered at action level. In real life applications, past this point
the users of these placement approaches may erroneously decide that there is no benefit
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in placing additional detectors and therefore stop placing detectors. If these approaches
must be used, a secondary objective should be considered when the primary objective is
completely satisfied. Surprisingly, the VA underperformed the RA results on almost all
sets of results. Further discussion of these behaviors is presented in the results analysis
section for those detector placement algorithms.
5.2.2 VA Results
The Volumetric Approach (VA) underperformed all other approaches, including the
RA. This was an unexpected result, especially considering the widespread use of this ap-
proach. For all data sets, the single detector layer cases yielded worse results than those
of the RA for both the full set of scenarios and the randomly selected subset of scenarios.
Is important to take into account that the MSDP, GC, MCLP (k“1), and MCLP (k“2)
algorithms stop intelligently placing detectors after fulfilling their main objective, and
therefore past this point they can not be fairly compared. However, in most instances, and
even using a much higher number of detectors, VA results are worse or at best in the same
range as those obtained by these approaches prior to this point. Adding detector layers did
not represent great improvement. When additional layers of detectors are used at several
heights, absurd numbers of detectors are required, and the results achieved still continue
to underperform those of the RA.
Kelsey et al. (2002, 2005) have previously assessed the performance of this approach
on a simulated o↵shore facility, their findings outline to a great extent the reasons for the
poor performance observed in Figures 5.1-5.8. In their study, infrared detectors (point and
line of sight), and catalytic detectors were placed aiming to guarantee the detection of a
5m diameter explosive cloud. For the base cases analyzed, 24 point detectors (two hori-
zontal layers), and 4 beam detectors, were necessary. The proposed placements failed to
detect all releases, however, infrared detectors outperformed catalytic detectors in almost
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every aspect. Three reasons were provided for undetected releases and long detection
times. First, small leak rates (§ 1 kg ¨ s´1) led to the formation of small and hard to de-
tect clouds. Secondly, some leaks had concentrations below detector alarm and/or action
signaling levels. Finally, high momentum horizontal releases missed the detector grid due
to the false expectancy that buoyancy would transport releases up to the detectors. For
releases forming 5m diameter clouds, only the infrared point detector grid was successful
in detecting all releases at alarm level, but not at action level. For this same grid to detect
these releases at action level the cloud size would have to reach 7m diameter. To address
these issues, the common recommendation is to further reduce the spacing between detec-
tors. In the case of Kelsey et al. (2002, 2005) this resulted only in a slight decrease in the
mean detection times.
For our study, real leak dispersion behavior resulted in cloud shapes that were not
spherical and lengths higher than the separation between detectors. Furthermore, for small
clouds and slow leak rates, long times to detection were observed, and in some cases leaks
were not detected at all. Also, parts of the geometry with higher congestion and/or con-
finement will still pose a structural risk to the facility. Additionally, our results provide
quantitative evidence of a well-known deficiency of this approach. The number of detec-
tors necessary, even for the standard 5m cloud, can be prohibitive (Center for Chemical
Process Safety (CCPS), 2009; International Society of Automation (ISA), 2010; Kelsey
et al., 2002, 2005). Since this methodology was initially developed for o↵shore facilities,
this is a special concern for onshore facilities, which usually have even larger volumes. In
our studies, this approach was not only ine↵ective, but also impractical due to the unrea-
sonable number of detectors required.
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5.2.3 MSDP Results
From the perspective of the three metrics, the MSDP can be considered the detector
placement approach with the second worst results. Since it was assumed that one detector
was su cient to cover a given leak source, i.e., voting requirements were ignored, after the
number of detectors is equal to the number of leaks sources the MSDP stops intelligently
placing detectors and can not be fairly compared. However, for the range of results where
it can be fairly compared, the MSDP underperformed all of the other approaches with the
exception of the RA and VA.
Furthermore, it was observed that for our data sets the detector closest to the leak
source was usually not the one that detected the particular leak scenario at alarm level,
frequently even the second closest detector was not the one that detected the particular leak
scenario at action level. That is, a detector placed near a leak location is not a guarantee
of leak detection. This is the basic reason behind the poor performance observed in the
three metrics, and constitutes strong evidence against the use of this approach. Momentum
e↵ects due to the leak source and/or a strong wind can easily drive the gas cloud away from
the detectors. These results are consistent with previously issued warnings regarding the
use of this approach (Bratteteig et al., 2011; Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS),
2009). Furthermore, since the primary concern of the gas detection system must be the
detection of gas leaks, and not the monitoring of leak sources, this approach can lead to
nuisance alarms due to insignificant normal operation leakage. The use of this approach
without supplementing it with proper dispersion studies and voting considerations may
lead to a false sense of security.
5.2.4 GC and MCLP Results
From the set of industry common methodologies (R, VA, MSDP, and GC), the best
results were obtained for the greedy scenario coverage algorithm (GC). This constitutes
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evidence of the advantages of supplementing detector placement practices using informa-
tion from dispersion simulations.
The main reason for the implementation of the MCLP (k“1) algorithm was to provide
an upper bound on the fraction of scenarios detected at alarm level in order to be able to
better compare the other approaches. Nevertheless, these results also confirmed previous
results presented in Benavides-Serrano et al. (2014) and Section 4, that neglecting voting
strategies in the placement algorithms can lead to a significant decrease in performance.
This is more evident when MCLP (k“1) and MCLP (k“2) results are compared. The
optimal layouts obtained for MCLP (k“1) di↵ered significantly from those obtained with
MCLP (k“2).
In all cases, for the expected time to detection metric, the MCLP (k“2) initially outper-
formed the GC algorithm, but was eventually slightly outperformed by the GC algorithm.
This is not surprising since the MCLP (k“2) aims for scenario coverage, not expected
time to detection. The MCLP (k“2) is able to cover all scenarios at action level with a
lower number of detectors and therefore stops intelligently placing detectors earlier than
the GC algorithm. However, and for the range in which both algorithms are comparable,
the improvement obtained by using an optimal algorithm becomes evident. Even though
they both use the same data, the MCLP (k“2) provides a sensible improvement in the frac-
tion of scenarios detected, and time to detection metrics, closely resembling the SP-UV
results. Furthermore, after obtaining scenario data, there is no reason not to use an optimal
method.
5.2.5 SP-UV Results
The SP-UV algorithm results confirm above-mentioned conclusions regarding the ef-
fectiveness of more informed detector placement approaches, and in particular, mathe-
matical programming approaches. For all the results presented the SP-UV formulation
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outperformed all the industry common methodologies in both action level metrics. The
fraction of scenarios covered at action level metric results were quite high, which was un-
expected since this was not the objective considered. For the full set of scenarios results
(Figures 5.1-5.4) they closely followed those of the MCLP (k“2) formulation. For the
scenarios subset results (Figures 5.5-5.8) the SP-UV results outperformed all of the other
approaches, including those of the MCLP (k“2) formulation. For the fraction of covered
scenarios at alarm level metric the only algorithm that outperformed the SP-UV formu-
lation was the GC algorithm. This result is not surprising, given that the GC algorithm
prioritizes the coverage of scenarios at alarm level.
For the full set of scenarios results (Figures 5.1-5.4) the expected time to detection of
the SP-UV formulation was at all times 30 seconds or less than the best industry common
methodology (usually the GC algorithm). For the type of mitigation scenarios for which
gas detection is designed, 30 seconds or more can represent the di↵erence between low and
catastrophic consequences. Furthermore, in most cases the amount of detectors necessary
to achieve similar results with the SP-UV formulation are substantially lower than those
necessary with the common industry approaches. A remarkable example is provided by
data set A (the one associated with the largest geometry). For the results obtained with the
full set of scenarios, the amount of detectors necessary to obtain the same expected time to
detection and fraction of covered scenarios at action level with the SP-UV formulation was
more than an order of magnitude lower that those of the VA. This is strong evidence of the
performance improvement that can be achieved using dispersion data and mathematical
programming formulations.
5.3 Summary
In this section, four existing approaches for gas detector placement were implemented
and compared with the previously proposed quantitative optimization-based approach (SP-
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UV, Section 4). The existing approaches compared correspond to the Random Approach
(RA), the Volumetric Approach (VA), the minimum detector distance to leak source heuris-
tic, and a Greedy scenario Coverage approach (GC). Apart from formulation SP-UV, two
additional mathematical programming formulations were further proposed to capture the
essence behind the placement heuristics and metrics presented. The first, formulation
MSDP, embeds the minimum detector distance to leak source heuristic and was imple-
mented to eliminate subjectivity in the analysis of this heuristic. The second, formulation
MCLP, provides an upper bound on the maximum coverage possible given a number of de-
tectors. It was proposed as a mean for assessing the full capabilities of scenario coverage
considerations. In accordance to the objectives of gas detection systems, expected time
to detection and scenario coverage metrics were assessed for real sets of CFD dispersion
data.
Initially, results were reported using the full data sets for placement and evaluation
(Figures 5.1-5.4). These figures yielded three main findings. First, for our study, the Vol-
umetric Approach (VA) consistently performed poorly. This was a direct consequence of
the real dispersion cloud shapes not being spherical, a basic assumption behind the use of
this approach. Second, the approaches that do not make use of dispersion simulations (R,
VA, MSDP) were compared against those that do (GC, MCLP, SP-UV). From this com-
parison, it is evident that quality dispersion simulations provide a sensible improvement
in the performance of the detection and mitigation system. Finally, the approaches that
rigorously optimize the objectives (MCLP and SP-UV) were compared versus those that
do not (GC). This comparison showed that numerical optimization techniques provide a
suitable approach to further improve the performance of gas detector placements.
A second set of results was presented to further validate previous results and analyze
the performance of the approaches in the presence unforeseen scenarios not considered
during placement. A randomly selected sample of 75% of the data was used to obtain
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detector placement results. These placements were then evaluated on the remaining 25%
of the data. As expected, the results for the detector placement approaches that do not
require dispersion scenario data (MSDP and VA) did not have a substantial change in
behavior. Also expected, the performance of the approaches that make use of scenario
data (MCLP, GC, and SP-UV) decreased since not all scenarios were considered during
placement. However, these approaches continued to outperform the algorithms that do not
require dispersion data (MSDP, VA). Furthermore, the approaches that rigorously optimize
the objectives (MCLP and SP-UV) continued to outperform the ones that do not (GC). It
is clear that the use of dispersion simulations and numerical optimization improves the
performance of the gas detector placement.
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6. BACKUP DETECTION LEVELS EFFECT IN P-MEDIAN FORMULATIONS
FOR OPTIMAL PLACEMENT OF DETECTORS IN MITIGATION SYSTEMS *
The uniform unavailability assumption used in formulations SP-U and SP-UV (Sec-
tions 3 and 4, respectively) is reasonable for detection and mitigation systems that use the
same type of detectors under the same process, environmental, maintenance and repair
conditions. However, if this is not the case, the e↵ect of individual detector unavailabil-
ity needs to be taken into account. This consideration introduces nonlinearities due to
the multiplication of probabilities in the objective function that are dependent on detector
placement.
As indicated by Snyder and Daskin (2005) and Berman et al. (2007), when the fail-
ure probability is reasonably low, the probabilities associated with higher coverage levels
quickly tend to zero, and there is often no need to consider more than a few detection
levels. Real detectors are expected to have reasonably low unavailability values as pre-
sented in Section 1.3.2. However, previously proposed formulations for this problem do
not explicitly consider individual detection levels and are not able to take advantage of
this feature. The number of variables in the nonlinear product terms is determined by
the number of locations capable of detecting individual scenarios. In contrast, our for-
mulations explicitly consider detection levels. This opens then possibility to propose an
extended formulation (formulation SPqt, Section 7) that considers a subset of the total
possible number of levels, truncating the number of variables in the nonlinear products
that form the objective function. In this formulation, the maximum number of variables
* Part of this section is reprinted with permission from “E↵ect of Backup Detection Levels in P-Median
Formulations for Optimal Placement of Detectors in Mitigation Systems” by Benavides-Serrano, A. J.,
Hackebeil, G., Mannan, M. S., and Laird, C. D., 2014. Proceedings of the 8th International Conference
on Foundations of Computer-Aided Process Design (FOCAPD), Washington, USA, July 2014, Copyright
2014 by Elsevier Ltd.
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in the objective function products is given by C´1, where C is the number of backup de-
tection levels considered. While the size of the problem would increase with the number
of detection levels treated, the complexity of the problem would be dictated by the choice
of the modeller rather than the problem data itself. Motivated by this perspective, Section
6 uses real facility data for the optimal gas detector placement problem to determine the
impact of changing the number of detection levels and select a level of redundancy that
gives a reasonable accuracy.
6.1 E↵ect of Backup Detection Levels
Based on representative unavailability values for the gas detector placement problem
(Section 1.3.2), a sensitivity analysis was performed to test the resilience of formulation
SPqt to the truncation of the objective function. This sensitivity analysis was carried out
and validated via the four data sets presented in Section 1.3.1. Damage coe cients and
scenario probabilities were calculated following the same considerations presented in Sec-
tion 3.2. Two di↵erent metrics were implemented. For both metrics, the ideal case in
which the maximum allowed number of detector levels is equal to the number of allowed
detectors (i.e.,C“p) was used as the base case. The first metric corresponds to the number
of matching detector locations between the truncated objective solution and the base case
solution. The second metric corresponds to the percent di↵erence between the truncated
objective solution and the base case.
For data set A, three di↵erent unavailability values were assessed, q“0.05, q“0.1, and
q“0.2. As presented in Section 1.3.2, q“0.05 corresponds to a conservative unavailability
value for real gas detectors, from both the time-averaged and instantaneous perspective.
The two additional values correspond to the common industry rule of thumb for gas detec-
tor time-averaged unavailability (q“0.1), and a representative value for highly substandard
repair and maintenance practices (q“0.2). In every test, a uniform unavailability was as-
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sumed for all detectors. As presented in Section 7, under this assumption, formulation
SPqt collapses back to formulation SP-U and the optimal solution to formulation SP-U
is also provably optimal for formulation SPqt. This assumption enabled us to obtain sen-
sitivity results for real size data sets, a task otherwise unachievable since it would have
required the solution of the general non-linear formulation (or the complete enumeration
of the detector placement combinations for a small subset of the real data as in Berman
et al. (2007)).
6.2 Numerical Results Analysis
Figure 6.1 present the objective function truncation e↵ect for q“0.1. Three di↵erent
objective function truncations are presented, C“0, C“1, and C“2. As the maximum
number of detector backup levels (C) in the formulation is increased the matching location
metric will quickly follow the ideal line, while the percent di↵erence will tend to zero.
With C • 5 the base case and the truncated objective formulation will yield the same
results for all the range of allowed detectors presented in the figures. In all cases, for
a low number of detectors both solutions are the same, but as the number of detectors
increases they diverge. Initially, for a low number of detectors, both formulations strive
to cover the primary detection level. As the number of allowed detectors is increased,
formulation focus changes and the extra detectors are preferentially employed to cover
the first backup level. As the number of allowed detectors keeps increasing, the focus
changes to the second backup level, and so on. With each successive change of focus the
importance of the neglected objective function terms increases. The incremental e↵ect
of this lack of information results in the divergent behavior of the solutions. However,
even with a high number of allowed detectors (up to 100), for C“1 the percent di↵erence
between the solutions is less than 1.4% for all the range of allowed detectors presented.
Adding additional backup levels brings the gap to less than 0.05% and 0.001% for the
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(a) q“0.1, C“0 (b) q“0.1, C“0
(c) q“0.1, C“1 (d) q“0.1, C“1
(e) q“0.1, C“2 (f) q“0.1, C“2
Figure 6.1: Data set A sensitivity analysis results. Numbers of backup levels e↵ect. Ob-
jective functions truncated at 0, 1, and 2 backup levels (C“0, 1, 2) for q¯“0.1. Matching
locations results are presented in Figures 6.1a, 6.1c, and 6.1e. Expected time to detection
percent di↵erence results are presented in Figures 6.1b, 6.1d, and 6.1f.
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(a) q“0.05, C“1 (b) q“0.05, C“1
(c) q“0.2, C“1 (d) q“0.2, C“1
Figure 6.2: Data set A sensitivity analysis results. Time-averaged unavailability e↵ect.
Objective functions truncated at 1 backup level (C“1) for q¯“0.05 and q¯“0.2. Matching
locations results are presented in Figures 6.2a and 6.2c. Expected time to detection percent
di↵erence results are presented in Figures 6.2b and 6.2d.
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(a) Data set B, q“0.05, C“1 (b) Data set B, q“0.05, C“1
(c) Data set C, q“0.05, C“1 (d) Data set C, q“0.05, C“1
(e) Data set D, q“0.05, C“1 (f) Data set D, q“0.05, C“1
Figure 6.3: Data sets B, C, and D objective functions truncated at 1 backup level (C“1) for
q¯“0.05. Matching locations results are presented in Figures 6.3a, 6.3c, and 6.3e. Expected
time to detection percent di↵erence results are presented in Figures 6.3b, 6.3d, and 6.3f.
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C“2 and C“3 cases, respectively. Moreover, above a certain number of detectors, placing
additional detectors is not cost-e↵ective due to the negligible improvement in the expected
value of the damage. Optimal solutions above this number will not be of any interest
due to their lack of real world applicability. The lower the time-averaged unavailabilities,
the closer this number can be expected to be to the point at which the solutions start to
diverge. According to the results presented in Benavides-Serrano et al. (2014) for the same
case study (data set A and q“0.1), this point is located before 50 detectors. For the 1´50
detector range the percentage gap is less than 0.7% and 0.03% for theC“1 andC“2 cases,
respectively. Note both metrics behavior for p ° 71 in Figures 6.1a and 6.1b. Past this
point, the truncated formulation makes no additional improvement in its objective since all
scenarios are already covered at primary coverage level (r“0). The truncated formulation
will not benefit from the allocation of more detectors, while the base case formulation will
continue to benefit from the allocation of new detectors by providing additional backup
coverage.
Figure 6.2 present results for q“0.05 and q“0.2 for data set A with C“1. When
compared to Figures 6.1c and 6.1d, these figures illustrate the unavailability e↵ect on
the formulation results. As expected, higher unavailabilities result in higher importance
of the neglected objective function terms, and therefore in earlier, and higher, solution
divergency. For this data set, and even for the wide range of allowed detectors presented,
for a conservative time-averaged detector unavailability value (q“0.05) the use of one
backup level (C“1) is enough to bring the gap down to less than 0.31%. Even in the
case of highly substandard maintenance and repair practices (q“0.2) and real data sets,
truncation at C“1 still yields results comparable to those reported for heuristic algorithms
on small test instances.
Data set A results were validated using the three remaining data sets with the objective
function truncated at one backup level (C“1) and an unavailability of q“0.05. Results are
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presented in Figure 6.3. The percent di↵erences between the truncated objective solution
and the base case were less than 0.38% (data set B), 0.13% (data set C), and 0.87% (data
set D) for a range of 1´100 detectors. Note again both metrics behavior for p ° 69 in
Figures 6.3c and 6.3d (data set C). The reason for this behavior is analog to that of Figures
6.1a and 6.1b. Past this point, the truncated formulation makes no additional improvement
in its objective since all scenarios are already covered at coverage levels r“0 and r“1.
Based on these results it is possible to conclude that for standard unavailability values,
proposed formulation SPqt with C“1 provides a good trade-o↵ between computational
complexity and solution accuracy.
6.3 Summary
An analysis of the trade-o↵ between the number of coverage levels considered in our
formulations and their solution accuracy was presented. In process facilities, gas detectors
can be expected to have unavailabilities below 0.05 (both instantaneous and averaged).
Given these unavailability values, probabilities associated with higher coverage levels are
expected to quickly tend to zero. We analyze this trade-o↵ by using 4 real data sets for
the gas detector placement problem. Two metrics were employed for this analysis, the
matching detector locations between the truncated objective solution and the base case
solution, and the percent di↵erence between the truncated objective solution and the base
case. Results in both metrics confirmed the feasibility of considering just a few backup
detector levels under real industry gas detector unavailability values. Furthermore, our
results show that two detection levels are su cient to find objective values within 1% of
the optimal solution.
This analysis was performed in order to exploit this feature on a future extension of our
formulation. Based on the results obtained in this section, it is reasonable to consider two
detection levels in order to obtain an MINLP formulation that can be solved to optimality
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with minimal deterioration of the optimal objective. Using two detection levels reduces
the general nonlinear formulation to a quadratic formulation, opening the door for more
e cient global optimization methods on this challenging problem.
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7. EXTENDED FORMULATIONS CONSIDERING DYNAMIC NONUNIFORM
UNAVAILABILITIES *
If the uniform unavailability assumption in the SP-U formulation (Section 3) is not
valid, the modeler is forced to deal with nonuniform detector unavailabilities, and nonlin-
earities arise due to products of probabilities that depend on detector selection. Current
solution strategies for these MINLPs rely on random sampling, heuristic and greedy algo-
rithms, ignoring the detector imperfection, or lumping the locations into detection classes
based on their associated unavailability. Several of these strategies can not guarantee high
solution quality, while others depend on assumptions similar to that of uniform unavail-
ability.
In this section, we present formulation SPqt, an extension to formulation SP-U that
considers the dynamic and nonuniform characteristics of the detector unavailabilities. For-
mulation SPqt relaxes the assumption of an identical time-averaged unavailability for all
detectors by allowing detector unavailabilities to di↵er by location and time. Formulation
SPqt, like those previously presented in the literature, leads to a mixed-integer nonlinear
programming formulation due to the need to model products of nonuniform unavailabili-
ties. However, formulation SPqt explicitly considers individual detection levels, allowing
the modeler to specify a predetermined number of detection levels and, hence, problem
complexity.
This section is organized as follows. Section 7.1 discusses previous nonuniform un-
availability extensions to the PMP and SP formulations. Section 7.2 introduces formula-
* Part of this section is reprinted with permission from “E↵ect of Backup Detection Levels in P-Median
Formulations for Optimal Placement of Detectors in Mitigation Systems” by Benavides-Serrano, A. J.,
Hackebeil, G., Mannan, M. S., and Laird, C. D., 2014. Proceedings of the 8th International Conference
on Foundations of Computer-Aided Process Design (FOCAPD), Washington, USA, July 2014, Copyright
2014 by Elsevier Ltd.
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tion SPqt. Section 7.3 presents a quadratic version of formulation SPqt that provides a
good compromise between accuracy and complexity. The truncation to a quadratic formu-
lation is supported by the analysis of the e↵ect that the backup detection levels have on
the solution quality (Section 6). Three solution strategies are proposed for this zero-one
quadratic problem: SPqt-Q, SPqt-L1, and SPqt-L2 (Sections 7.3.1, 7.3.2, and 7.3.3, respec-
tively). The computational e ciency of these solution strategies is shown in Section 7.4.
Section 7.5 presents a solution quality comparison between the quadratic formulation and
approximate solution strategies previously proposed by Berry et al. (2009a) and Berman
et al. (2007). A summary is presented in Section 7.6.
7.1 Nonuniform Unavailability Extensions to the PMP and SP Formulations
In the context of facility location, Berman et al. (2007) presented the Median Problem
with Unreliable Facilities (MPUF) along with a discussion of nodal optimality and asymp-
totic results for this problem. Three versions of the MPUF are presented. The first version
corresponds to a general MPUF objective function where nonuniform unavailabilities are
assumed for each facility. The second version is the uniform-MPUF, where the facility
unavailabilities are assumed to be uniform. The uniform MPUF formulation closely re-
sembles the one proposed by Snyder and Daskin (2005). The third version presented, the
uniform pr,mq-MPUF problem, is a variant of the uniform-MPUF formulation where only
the r closest facilities (out of the total m) are used to model the failure/success to obtain
service. A greedy heuristic and an improved version of this heuristic were proposed to
solve the problems. By using explicit enumeration on small test instances of the general
MPUF objective function, percentage di↵erence errors of 8% and 5% were reported for
the greedy heuristic and its improved version, respectively.
Along the lines of the general MPUF by Berman et al. (2007), Berry et al. (2009b) pre-
sented formulation impSP. This formulation treats variable xa,i in the original SP formu-
86
lation as the probability that a detector placed at location i is the first to detect hazardous
scenario a. This is achieved by replacing Equation (2.1d) with Equation (7.1), where
L†a,i Ä La is the set of locations with a damage coe cient lower than that of location i
for hazardous scenario a. Parameter q¯i represents the time-averaged unavailability of the
detector to be placed at location i. The use of Equation (7.1) results in an Mixed Integer
Nonlinear Programming (MINLP) formulation. Berry et al. (2009b) proposed six solution
strategies to obtain approximate solutions.
xa,i “ p1´ q¯iqsi
π
jPL†a,i
p1´ p1´ q¯ jqs jq , @a P A, i P La (7.1)
The concept of backup levels is not explicitly incorporated in formulation impSP. If a
given scenario a is detected by a total of |La| candidate locations, the longest nonlinear
term in the formulation will correspond to a product of |La| integer variables (Equation
7.1).
For small to moderate unavailabilities, the work by Snyder and Daskin (2005) and
Berman et al. (2007) in the facility location context provides evidence of the convenience
and viability of considering only the dominant terms in the probability products. This re-
sult has been validated for heuristic algorithms and exact uniform-unavailability formula-
tions. Furthermore, analogous behavior was observed for the detector placement problem
while obtaining the results presented in Sections 3 and 4. When the unavailabilities are
reasonably low, the probabilities associated with higher coverage levels quickly tend to
zero, and there is often no need to consider more than a few detection levels. In practice,
this allows the modeler to specify the maximum degree of the nonlinear products based on
the trade-o↵ between computational complexity and accuracy. Due to its explicit treatment
of backup detection levels, formulation SP-U provides a natural way of incorporating this
idea for exact formulations with non-uniform unavailabilities. An extended formulation,
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SPqt, is presented in Section 7.2 for this purpose.
7.2 SP Formulation Including Individual Nonuniform Mean Unavailabilities (SPqt)
This formulation is a generalization of the SP-U formulation previously presented in
Section 3. Formulation SPqt is presented in Equation (7.2). Notation is provided in Table
A.1.
min
ª F
0
Eptq
F
dt (7.2a)
s.t.ÿ
iPLa
xa,i,r “ 1 @ a P A, r P R (7.2b)
ÿ
lPL
sl § p (7.2c)ÿ
rPRa,i
xa,i,r § si @ a P A, i P LazDa (7.2d)
ÿ
iPLa
da,ixa,i,r §
ÿ
iPLa
da,ixa,i,r`1, @a P A, tr|r P R, r § C ´ 1u (7.2e)
sl P t0, 1u @ l P L (7.2f)
xa,i,r P t0, 1u @ a P A, i P La, r P Ra,i (7.2g)
The objective function (7.2a) is the expected value of the overall damage consider-
ing the probability of detection failure/success. Term Eptq (Equation 7.3) represents the
expected value of the overall damage at a given point in time.
Eptq “ÿ
aPA
↵a
ÿ
iPLa
ÿ
rPRa,i
da,i p1´ qiptqq xa,i,r a,i,rpxq (7.3)
Parameter F represents the projected life of the facility. Therefore, integral
≥F
0 Eptq{F dt
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represents the expected value of the damage over all the projected life of the facility. The
trapezoidal rule (Equation 7.4) was used for the numerical integration of the objective
function. The domain was discretized into n equally spaced samples.
ª F
0
Eptq
F
dt “
´
Ep0q
2 `
∞n´1
k“1 Ep kFn q ` EpFq2
¯
n
(7.4)
The main feature inherited from formulation SP-U is the concept of detection levels.
As in SP-U (Section 3.1), and in order to accommodate this concept, variable xa,i,r indicates
that scenario a is detected at coverage level r by location i (xa,i,r“1, and 0 otherwise).
As well, a set R of C coverage levels was defined. The maximum size of the nonlinear
products in the objective function is given by C ` 1. Subsets Ra,i are defined for each pair
of scenario a and location i. These correspond to the set of backup levels in R that location
i can occupy given its associated damage coe cient (da,i). Parameter qiptq corresponds to
the instantaneous unavailability (at time t) of the detector to be placed at location i. For all
dummy locations, qiptq “ 0 @t ° 0.
Due to the relaxation of the uniform unavailability assumption, the binomial distri-
bution can not be used anymore to model detector failure, therefore, formulation SP-U
objective function was modified to accommodate the products of nonuniform unavailabil-
ities. Consider a minimal example where a single scenario a (i.e., ↵a“1) can be detected
by 4 detector locations. If da,1 † da,2 † da,3 † da,4, and a total of 4 detection levels are
allowed (i.e., C“3 and R“t0, 1, 2, 3u), term Eptq (Equation 7.3) would correspond to:
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da,1 p1´ q1ptqq xa,1,0`
da,2 p1´ q2ptqq xa,2,0`
da,3 p1´ q3ptqq xa,3,0`
da,4 p1´ q4ptqq xa,4,0`
da,2 p1´ q2ptqq xa,2,1 q1ptqxa,1,0`
da,3 p1´ q3ptqq xa,3,1 pq2ptqxa,2,0 ` q1ptqxa,1,0q`
da,4 p1´ q4ptqq xa,4,1 pq3ptqxa,3,0 ` q2ptqxa,2,0 ` q1ptqxa,1,0q`
da,3 p1´ q3ptqq xa,3,2 q2ptqxa,2,1 q1ptqxa,1,0`
da,4 p1´ q4ptqq xa,4,2 pq3ptqxa,3,1 q2ptqxa,2,0 ` q2ptqxa,3,1 q2ptqxa,1,0 ` q1ptqxa,2,1 q2ptqxa,1,0q
da,4 p1´ q4ptqq xa,4,3 q3ptqxa,3,2 q2ptqxa,2,1 q1ptqxa,1,0
(7.5)
For example, if we assume that p“2, and the selected candidate locations are i“1 and
i“4, then the scenario will be detected by location 1 (with probability 1´q1ptq) or, location
1 will fail, and it will be detected by location 4 (with probability p1 ´ q4ptqq q1ptq). With
the selected detector locations 1 and 4, and the damage coe cients ordered as indicated,
xa,1,0“1 and xa,4,1“1, while all other xa,i,r“0, Equation (7.5) gives the result stated above.
Likewise, if p“3 and the selected locations are i“2, i“3, and i“4, then the expected value
is given by p1 ´ q2ptqq ` p1 ´ q3ptqq q2ptq ` p1 ´ q4ptqq q3ptq q1ptq, which is captured
correctly by Equation (7.5) where xa,2,0“1, xa,3,1“1, and xa,4,2“1, while all other xa,i,r“0
By using this example, it is possible to better understand the significance of term
 a,i,rpxq in Equation (7.3).  a,i,rpxq represents the summation of all the possible probability
combinations associated with detector failure that will result in the detection of scenario a
at coverage level r by the detector at candidate location i. All the possible combinations
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need to be included in  a,i,rpxq since we do not know a priori which candidate detector
locations will be selected. For the example presented in Equation (7.5), the corresponding
expressions for  a,i,rpxq are presented in Equation Set (7.6).
 a,1,0pxq “  a,2,0pxq “  a,3,0pxq “  a,4,0pxq “ 1
 a,2,1pxq “ q¯1xa,1,0
 a,3,1pxq “ q¯2xa,2,0 ` q¯1xa,1,0
 a,4,1pxq “ q¯3xa,3,0 ` q¯2xa,2,0 ` q¯1xa,1,0
 a,3,2pxq “ q¯2xa,2,1 q¯1xa,1,0
 a,4,2pxq “ q¯3xa,3,1 q¯2xa,2,0 ` q¯3xa,3,1 q¯1xa,1,0 ` q¯2xa,2,1 q¯1xa,1,0
 a,4,3pxq “ q¯3xa,3,2 q¯2xa,2,1 q¯1xa,1,0
(7.6)
It is important to notice that for a given scenario a and detection level r, only one
 a,i,rpxq will be di↵erent from zero. Also, for any given  a,i,rpxq, only one term in the
summation will be di↵erent from zero. This is due to the relation between  a,i,rpxq and
xa,i,r variables.
Contraints 7.2b - 7.2d correspond to those previously presented for formulation SP-
U. The first constraint (7.2b) guarantees that every scenario a is detected by a detector at
each coverage level r (dummy variables relax this constraint). Equation (7.2c) provides
an upper limit, p, on the number of detectors allowed. Equation (7.2d) links the existence
of a detector to the coverage levels for a given scenario a. Equation (7.2e) guarantees the
proper order of the detection levels. nonlinear
It is important to notice that under the assumption of a uniform time-averaged detec-
tor unavailability, formulation SPqt is equivalent to formulation SP-U. First, at all points
in time, the probability assigned to the detection of scenario a at coverage level r by the
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detector at candidate location i will be the same (i.e.,  a,i,r = q¯ r @a P A, i P La, r P Ra,i).
Second, constraint (7.2e) becomes redundant and can be removed from the formulation.
As demonstrated by Snyder and Daskin (2005), if all detectors have the same unavail-
ability, the objective function alone will guarantee that for each scenario a, the detector
assigned to the coverage level r will always be a detector with a smaller damage coe -
cient than the detector assigned to coverage level r`1. Applying these two simplifications
to formulation SPqt will result in formulation SP-U previously presented by Benavides-
Serrano et al. (2014).
The size of formulation SPqt instances increases with the number of detection levels
(C) treated. When compared to formulation impSP by Berry et al. (2009b), the number
of variables in formulation SPqt will lineally increase with the number of detection levels
used. As well, the number of nonlinear terms will be increased due to the necessity of
computing each of the possible failure possibilities independently. However, the complex-
ity of the problem is dictated by the degree of the polynomial objective (i.e., by the choice
of the modeler) rather than the problem data itself.
7.3 Quadractic SPqt Formulation (SPqt-Q): Solution Strategies
Based on the results in Section 6, is expected that two detection levels are su cient
to find objective values within 1% of the optimal solution for the full formulation. Based
on this analysis, formulation 7.2 can be truncated at the first backup level (i.e. C“1 and
R“t0, 1u) with little loss of solution quality. The resulting formulation is a linearly con-
strained zero-one Quadratic Programming (QP) formulation. This formulation is far less
computationally expensive than the full initial nonlinear formulation due to the reduction
in the number of variables and the reduction in the order of the products summed in the
objective function. Note that this order reduction greatly improves the problem condition-
ing (i.e. reduces the ratio between the largest and the smallest coe cient in the objective
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function). However, solution of general QP problems is still challenging and this does not
guarantee that solution times will be reasonable for the typical problem sizes arising in the
placement of gas detectors. Three solution strategies, SPqt-Q, SPqt-L1, and SPqt-L2, are
assessed below.
7.3.1 SPqt-Q
The first solution strategy assessed was to solve the actual QP problem directly with
an o↵-the-shelf solver. For this purpose, the expected value of the damage at time t, Eptq
(Equation 7.3), was truncated at the first backup level as presented in Equation (7.7). The
integral definition in Equation (7.4) remains the same. Notation for the formulation is
provided in Table A.1. The Pyomo model file containing formulation SPqt-Q is presented
in Appendix K.
Eptq «ÿ
aPA
↵a
ÿ
iPLa
¨˝
da,i p1´ qiptqq xa,i,0 `
ÿ
jPL°a,i
da, j qiptq p1´ qjptqq xa,i,0 xa, j,1‚˛ (7.7)
7.3.2 SPqt-L1
The second solution strategy corresponds to a standard exact reformulation strategy
for zero-one QP problems. The bilinearities in the objective function involve binary vari-
ables only, it is possible to reformulate these bilinearities to obtain a linear objective. For
this purpose, Equation set (7.8) was incorporated into formulation SPqt. Notation is pro-
vided in Table A.1. The Pyomo model file containing formulation SPqt-L1 is presented in
Appendix L.
Eptq «ÿ
aPA
↵a
ÿ
iPLa
¨˝
da,i p1´ qiptqq xa,i,0 `
ÿ
jPL°a,i
da, j qiptq p1´ qjptqqwa,i, j‚˛ (7.8a)
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wa,i, j • xa,i,0 ` xa, j,1 ´ 1 @ a P A, i P La, j P L°a,i (7.8b)
0 § wa,i, j § 1 @ a P A, i P La, j P L°a,i (7.8c)
Equation (7.8a) defines Eptq (previously defined by Equation 7.3). Equations (7.8b)
and (7.8c) are supplementary sets of constraints added to formulation SPqt for reformu-
lation purposes. Constraint (7.8c) stipulates continuous variable wa,i, j. Quadratic terms
xa,i,0 xa, j,1 in Equation (7.7) are replaced with variable wa,i, j resulting in a linear objective
function. Equation (7.8b) guarantees that wa,i, j will be able to take the value of 1, If, and
only if, both xa,i,0 and xa, j,1 are equal to 1. Otherwise, it will take the value of 0.
A drawback of this approach is the number of additional variables introduced in the
reformulation. The maximum number of wa,i,r variables for each of the M scenarios is
4N2 (assuming the number of necessary xa,i,r variables for each detection level is N). This
would result in a total of 4MN2 additional (allwa,i, j) variables. However, not every scenario
a is detected by every candidate detector location l. Furthermore, for a given scenario
a, variable wa,i, j will always be zero unless ti, ju P La and i † j. By preprocessing
the formulation with the specific problem data, the number of variables and constraints
(arising from Equations (7.8b) and (7.8c), respectively) can be reduced several orders of
magnitude to
∞
aPA
∞
iPLa |L°a,i|.
7.3.3 SPqt-L2
The third solution strategy corresponds to a exact linear reformulation strategy for
zero-one QP problems proposed by Sherali and Smith (2007). For this purpose, Equation
set (7.9) was incorporated into formulation SPqt (Equation set 7.2). Notation is provided
in Table A.1. The Pyomo model file containing formulation SPqt-L2 is presented in Ap-
pendix M.
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min
ÿ
aPA
↵a
˜ª L
0
E1pa, tq
F
dt ` ÿ
iPLa
za,i
¸
(7.9a)ª L
0
E2pa, tq
F
dt “ ya,i ` za,i @ a P A, i P La (7.9b)
ya,i § dmax p1´ xa,i,0q @ a P A, i P La (7.9c)
0 § ya,i † 8 @ a P A, i P La (7.9d)
0 § za,i † 8 @ a P A, i P La (7.9e)
With,
E1pa, tq «
ÿ
iPLa
da,i p1´ qiptqq xa,i,0 (7.10)
E2pa, tq «
ÿ
jPL°a,i
da, j qiptq p1´ qjptqq xa, j,1 (7.11)
Equation (7.9a) replaces objective function (Equation 7.2a in SPqt). At a given point
in time t, and for a given scenario a, term E1pa, tq (Equation 7.10) represents the primary
detection level contributions to the expected value of the damage. Likewise, at a given
point in time t and for a given scenario a, term E2pa, tq (Equation 7.11) represents the
first backup detection level contributions to the expected value of the damage. Therefore,
integral
≥F
0
E1pa,tq
F dt represents the primary detection level contributions to the expected
value of the damage over all the projected life of the facility (F) for a given scenario a.
Integral
≥F
0
E2pa,tq
F dt represents the first backup detection level contributions to the expected
value of the damage over all the projected life of the facility (F) for a given scenario a.
Again, the trapezoidal rule was used to evaluate these integrals.
Equations (7.9b) - (7.9e) are supplementary sets of constraints added to formulation
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SPqt for reformulation purposes. Contraint (7.9e) specifies continuous variable za,i. This
variable represents scenario a first backup detection level (r“1) interactions given the
selection of location i at coverage level primary detection level (r“0). Constraints (7.9d)
stipulates dummy continuos relaxation variables ya,i for the pair of scenario a and location
i. Equations (7.9c) and (7.9d) guarantee that the quadratic and the linear reformulation
of the problem are equivalent. For a given scenario a, if variable xa,i,0“0 in Constraint
(7.9e), dummy continuos variable ya,i will be allowed to take positive real values up to
dmax. Therefore the objective function will force za,i“0. On the other hand, if variable
xa,i,0“1 in Constraint (7.9e), then ya,i“0, and the objective function will force za,i to be
minimized based on the selection of the detector at the first backup level (r“1). The main
feature of this approach is its linear size with respect to the number of initial xa,i,0 variables
in the original quadratic problem.
7.4 Comparison of Formulations: Computational E ciency
Data set A, previously presented in Section 1.3.1, was employed for this analysis.
Relevant problem size metrics for each of the test instances are presented in Table 7.1 and
computational results are presented in Table 7.2. For a given data set, the parameter that
a↵ects the solution e ciency the most is the number of allowed detectors (p). To take into
account the solution e ciency sensitivity to this parameter, the solution strategies were
compared for a wide range of number of detectors. An upper bound of 64 GB of RAM or
100000 seconds was used for the results.
The optimization problems were formulated in Pyomo (Hart et al., 2011, 2012). Two
di↵erent solvers were employed. Formulation SPqt-Q results were obtained using CPLEX
12.5.1.0 (default parameters and one thread). Formulations SPqt-L1 and SPqt-L2 results
were obtained using Gurobi 5.6 (default parameters and one thread). CPLEX was more
e cient for the quadratic problem while Gurobi was superior for the linearized versions
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of the problem. All the problems were run on an Intel Xeon CPU E5-2697 v2 with a clock
speed of 2.7 GHz and 264 GB of RAM.
Instantaneous unavailability values were obtained by using Equation (1.2) along with
the average value for parameter   presented in Section 1.3.2 (1.03 ˚ 10´6ph´1q). The
projected life of the facility, F, was assumed to be 20 years. To test the formulation
under a wide range of possible ill-conditioning, 3 inspections and repair were randomly
generated for each of the possible detector locations. At these randomly generated points
in time, the unavailability of the detectors was reset back to 0 (perfect repair assumption).
Numerical integration was carried out with n“100. At the discrete points evaluated in
the numerical integral, the minimum and maximum instantaneous unavailability values
obtained were 6.92˚10´8 and 0.277, respectively. The minimum value reported ignores the
unavailabilities that are equal to zero. That is, the ones associated with dummy variables
and repairs/start-ups.
Solution Strategy
Data Set Object SPqt-Q SPqt-L1 SPqt-L2
A
Integer 11577 11577 11577
Continuous 0 130705 9488
Constraints 5873 136574 16645
Table 7.1: Solution Strategies: Problem sizes
The results demonstrate the e cacy of solving this problem by means of the linear
reformulation strategy SPqt-L2. Even an order of magnitude of improvement can be
achieved when SPqt-Q and SPqt-L2 are compared for a small number of detectors (p).
As well, for all the instances compared in Table 7.2, the RAM usage by SPqt-L1 and
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Solution Strategy
Data Set p SPqt-Q SPqt-L1 SPqt-L2
A
1 37.20 10.27 2.68
5 69.62 158.02 18.50
10 302.64 342.47 100.87
15 360.09 643.06 217.75
20 11436.12 23540.79 1963.97
25 5.47%: 78014.36 20194.54
30 11.13%: 4.22%: 5.05%:
35 13.54%: 5.04%: 6.05%:
40 11.23%: 5.30%: 5.78%:
45 11.53%* 5.54%: 5.10%:
50 9.33%* 4.29%: 3.89%:
*(g%) indicates that the branch-and-bound was
using more than 64 GB of RAM and was
stopped with a gap of g%
:(g%) indicates that the branch-and-bound was
stopped after 100000 seconds with a gap of g%
Table 7.2: Solution Strategies: Time to Solve (s)
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SPqt-L2 was only a small fraction of that required by SPqt-Q.
Our results agree with those presented by Sherali and Smith (2007). For the special
case of zero-one quadratic programs with Q • 0, and a single linear knapsack constraint,
Sherali and Smith (2007) reported higher e ciency of strategy SPqt-L2 when compared
to SPqt-L1. Additionally, Sherali and Smith (2007) recognized that when the parameter
in the right hand side of the constraint was increased (the analogous of p) the instances
became harder to solve, and it was no longer clear which of the formulations was the best
one. Our results support the same conclusion for our formulation.
Weighting the performance of the solution strategies over all the range of number of
detectors (p), we can recommend the use of linear reformulation strategy SPqt-L2 for the
solution of SPqt-Q. It is important to notice that the tightness of formulation SPqt-L2 is
heavily dependent on the term multiplying p1´ xa,i,0q in the right hand side of Equation
(7.9c). The maximum damage coe cient (dmax) was used for this purpose in the compu-
tational studies above. However, as noted by Sherali and Smith (2007), a preprocessing
step can be implemented to identify a value that provides the maximum possible tightness
(i.e. The maximum possible value for Integral
≥F
0
E2pa,tq
F dt). The improve in computational
e ciency of this pre-processing step is an interesting area for future work.
7.5 Quadractic SPqt Formulation (SPqt-Q): Solution Quality Comparison
In this section, we compare the solutions quality obtained by our quadratic formulation
with the placements produced by previous heuristic approaches from the literature. Based
on the results presented in Section 7.4, and taking again into account that this is a design
problem, it is computationally reasonable to solve the SPqt withC“1 for real size problem
instances. However, the solution quality improvement that the formulation can provide,
when compared to previous heuristic approaches for the PMP considering nonuniform
unavailabilities, remains unknown. For this purpose, some of the approximate approaches
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presented in Berry et al. (2009b) and Berman et al. (2007) were reproduced and compared
with the results obtained for the quadractic SPqt Formulation (SPqt-Q).
Four approaches were reproduced from Berry et al. (2009b): Random sampling (R),
ignoring imperfection (formulation SP), formulation SP-U (dcSP), and the one imperfect
witness formulation (oiwSP). Random sampling comprises generating random detector
placements, evaluating them using the full objective function (Equation 7.2a), and choos-
ing the best one as problem solution. The number of random detectors placements used for
this exercise was 105 for each data point. Ignoring imperfection neglects the unavailabili-
ties and makes use of the SP formulation (Section 2.1.3) to find an approximate solution.
The details of formulation SP-U are presented in Section 3.1. To apply this formulation,
the average unavailability value for the data set (q¯“0.061) was assigned to all candidate
locations. Under this assumption, formulation SP-U results are equivalent to formulation
dcSP (Berry et al. (2006a, 2009b)). Formulation dcSP assigns candidate locations to loca-
tion classes. All locations within a location class have the same average unavailability, this
allows to linearize the initial nonlinear formulation. Assigning the same average unavail-
ability value to all the candidate locations is equivalent to assigning all the locations to one
location class. Formulation oiwSP corresponds to formulation SP with the original dam-
age coe cient (da,i) replaced for a weighted damage coe cient (d 1a,i“p1´ q¯iqda,i` q¯idmax).
The Pyomo model file containing formulation oiwSP is presented in Appendix N.
Two approaches were reproduced from Berman et al. (2007): Greedy Heuristic(GH)
and Improved Greddy Heuristic (IGH). At each iteration, algorithm GH chooses the can-
didate detector location that minimizes the full objective function (Equation 7.2a). As
many iterations as allowed detectors, p, are performed. Algorithm IGH uses GH results
and refine them by relocating one detector at a time. The Python files corresponding to
the implementation of algorithms GH and IGH are presented in Appendices O and P,
respectively.
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Figure 7.1: Comparison showing the value of SPqt-Q formulation. This figure shows the
expected time to detection from the placements produced by SPqt-Q when compared to
placements produced by previous heuristic approaches from the literature. This metric is
displayed as percent di↵erence from the SPqt-Q results. That is, the percentage di↵erences
between the value of the SPqt objective calculated with the optimal SPqt-Q placement and
the value of the SPqt objective calculated with the placement provided by the heuristic (R,
SP, SP-U, oiwSP, GH, or IGH).
These approaches were compared via the expected time to detection percentage dif-
ference metric presented in Section 3. The base case solution corresponds in all cases to
the SPqt results obtained with C“1. Data set A was used for this analysis. Results are
presented in Figure 7.1.
The comparison results presented in Figure 7.1 corroborate the results previously pre-
sented in Section 6 and demonstrate the higher solution quality can be obtained by solving
the quadratic version of formulation SPqt to optimality. For all, but one point (dcSP/SP-U
with 49 detectors), placements from SPqt-Q outperform all of the other approaches. As
expected, from the set of compared approaches, the random sampling (R) approach under-
performed all of the others. For most of the data range displayed in Figure 7.1, the expected
time to detection percentage di↵erence (between SPqt-Q and the random sampling) was
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higher than 100%. In terms of solution quality, GH and IGH algorithms followed random
sampling. Algorithm IGH did not constitute a sensible improvement when compared to
algorithm GH results. In term of solution quality, the fourth and fifth place corresponded
to SP and oiwSP, respectively. Again, redefining the damage coe cient via formulation
oiwSP did not provide a significant improvement when compared to formulation SP. These
two formulations provided good solution quality until around 20 detectors. Initially, SP,
oiwSP, and SPqt-Q will preferentially provide a primary coverage level of the scenarios.
However, when the amount of detectors is su ciently larger, SPqt-Q will preferentially
employ detectors as backup coverage on high impact scenarios. Formulation SPqt-Q will
be essentially improving the second coverage level while SP and oiwSP will continue to
improve the first coverage level. At this point, SP and oiwSP solution quality starts to dra-
matically decline. This demonstrates the importance of explicitly considering the second
coverage level when performing the optimal placement. These results corroborate previ-
ous results on the solution quality improvement that can be obtained when comparing data
set A instances withC“0 andC“1 (Figures 6.1a-6.1d). Finally, SP-U formulation outper-
formed all of the other approaches with the exception of formulation SPqt-Q. Given the
low computational cost of formulation SP-U, its results appear as a promising alternative
for the preliminary assessment of the detector placement problem including non-uniform
unavailability considerations. It is important to notice that these results are true for the un-
availabilities values presented in Section 1.3.2, but may not be true if the unavailabilities
are larger (i.e., quadratic truncation may be poor).
7.6 Summary
In Section 3, we developed an MILP formulation, SP-U, for the optimal placement
of gas detectors in process facilities. Formulation SP-U assumed an uniform detector un-
availability. In this section, we extended formulation SP-U to relax this assumption while
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additionally including the dynamic unavailability behavior. Relaxing the uniform unavail-
ability assumption leads to nonlinear terms (and MINLPs) due to the need to model prod-
ucts of individual probabilities. However, and unlike previous nonuniform unavailability
formulations in the literature, our extended formulation, SPqt, explicitly incorporates the
concept of detection levels. This feature, inherited from SP-U, allows the modeler to easily
determine the maximum degree of the nonlinear products (i.e. number of coverage levels)
to be used based on the trade-o↵ between computational complexity and solution accuracy.
By making use of this feature, and leveraging the results obtained in Section 6, a truncated
(quadratic) version of formulation SPqt was proposed as an alternative to find high-quality
solutions to the full MINLP problem. Two linearized versions of SPqt-Q, formulations
SPqt-L1 and SPqt-L2, were presented and assessed from the computational e ciency per-
spective. Results demonstrated the convenience of the use of these linear reformulation
strategies for the solution of SPqt-Q. Finally, results from formulation SPqt-Q were com-
pared with a set of approximate solution strategies previously available in the literature for
the full MINLP problem. These results, obtained under real unavailability considerations,
provide two main conclusions. First, random (R) greedy (GH and IGH) algorithms are
outperformed by mathematical programming formulations (SP, oiwSP, SP-U and SPqt-Q).
Second, explicit consideration of backup levels in the mathematical programming formu-
lations (SP-U and SPqt-Q) will provide sensible solution quality improvement.
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8. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND FUTURE WORK *
To this day, gas detector placement in the process industries remains a major concern
for which the qualitative and semi-quantitave techniques proposed have significant room
for improvement. In this work, we focused on the extension and validation of quantitative
solutions to this problem. Specifically, we extended and validated previously developed
stochastic mathematical programming formulations in order to include the detector imper-
fections in the placement problem.
Section 1 presented the motivation behind the research in the optimal placement of
gas detectors. The wide impact that proper mitigation can have in the consequences of a
loss of containment scenario, the current state of detector placement approaches, and the
successful outcomes obtained in both the gas detection and water network communities,
make this an interesting and valuable problem to study and solve. Due to the availability
of CFD data, our research has focused on the optimal placement of gas detectors. The
data acquisition procedure was presented in Section 1.3.1. The data was obtained from
four independent data sets corresponding to a real, medium-scale, proprietary o↵shore
facility geometry capturing the full process features. Additionally, a discussion regarding
gas detector unavailability in the process industries was presented in Section 1.3.2 to pave
* Part of this section is reprinted with permission from ”A Stochastic Programming Approach for the
Optimal Placement of Gas Detectors: Unavailability and Voting Strategies” by Benavides-Serrano, A.
J., Legg S. W., Va´zquez-Roma´n R., Mannan, M. S., and Laird C. D., 2014. Industrial & Engineering
Chemistry Research, Copyright 2013 by American Chemical Society. ACS Articles on Request author-
directed link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1021/ie401369v.
Part of this section is reprinted with permission from “E↵ect of Backup Detection Levels in P-Median
Formulations for Optimal Placement of Detectors in Mitigation Systems” by Benavides-Serrano, A. J.,
Hackebeil, G., Mannan, M. S., and Laird, C. D., 2014. Proceedings of the 8th International Conference
on Foundations of Computer-Aided Process Design (FOCAPD), Washington, USA, July 2014, Copyright
2014 by Elsevier Ltd.
Part of this section is reprinted with permission from “A Quantitative Assessment on the Placement
Practices of Gas Detectors in the Process Industries” by Benavides-Serrano A. J., Mannan, M. S, and
Laird C. D., 2014. To appear in the Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries.
104
the way for the discussions in the subsequent sections.
A significant amount of work has been previously conducted by the operations research
community, the detector placement community, and our research group. Section 2 presents
a literature review of the previous developments on which the formulations presented are
based. The review covers the years of previous work invested by the operations research
community in furthering the modeling and solution of set covering and P-Median Prob-
lems (PMP), how this advancements resulted in formulation SP for the optimal placement
of detectors in water networks, and how formulation SP was further adopted and extended
for gas detector placement in mitigation systems.
Section 3 extended formulation SP to consider the possibility of detector failure, a key
feature associated with gas detector equipment and policies. Gas detectors are prone to
a number of failure modes that include failure to function on demand and no output sig-
nal. Formulation SP was extended by using a binomial distribution to include the detector
unavailability i.e. the possibility of false negative cases. Results were presented for the
proposed formulation (SP-U), and then compared with those previously obtained by Legg
et al. (2012a,b). The explicit treatment of detector unavailability in the formulation re-
sulted in changes to the optimal detector placement and significant improvements in the
expected time to detection when false negative alarms are are considered in the optimal
placement formulation.
Section 4 further extended formulation SP-U to include the requirement for a voting
logic. A voting logic scheme is commonly utilized in the industry to shield the detec-
tion and mitigation system against costly false positive alarms. Formulations SP-UV was
proposed to address this issue by explicitly including voting logic considerations into the
formulation via a negative binomial distribution. Formulation SP-UV results were pre-
sented and compared with optimal placement results from our previously proposed formu-
lations that ignore the voting logic considerations (SP and SP-U). As with the unavailabil-
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ity considerations in formulation SP-U, voting logic considerations in formulation SP-UV
resulted in changes to the optimal detector placement, and tangible improvements in the
expected time to detection when false positives alarms are considered in the optimal place-
ment formulation.
While Section 3 and 4 results demonstrated again the potential and suitability of nu-
merical optimization to solve the gas detector placement problem while rigorously con-
sidering its inherent uncertainties, further validation was presented in Section 5 to demon-
strate their potential. Four existing industry approaches for gas detector placement were
implemented and compared with the previously proposed quantitative optimization-based
approach SP-UV using three di↵erent performance metrics in accordance to the objectives
of gas detection systems. Results provided evidence on the e↵ectiveness of the use of
dispersion simulations, and mathematical programming, to supplement the gas detector
placement problem.
Until this point, the formulations presented (SP-U and SP-UV) assumed that the de-
tector unavailability was uniform across all the candidate detector locations. Considering
independent detector failure probabilities leads to a mixed-integer stochastic programming
formulation with nonlinear terms. However, since the nonlinear terms arise due to the need
of considering products of probabilities associated with detection levels, it is possible to
select a level of redundancy that gives a reasonable accuracy while reducing the complex-
ity of the MINLP. In Section 6 we analyzed the e↵ect of reducing the number of detection
levels considered using real unavailability data for the gas detector placement problem.
For the problem, our results show that there is minimal deterioration of the optimal ob-
jective as a result of this reduction. Furthermore, the results shown that objective values
within 1% of the optimal solution can be achieved by using only two detection levels.
Formulation SPqt was presented in Section 7. Formulation SPqt further extends for-
mulation SP-U by explicitly considering the dynamic and nonuniform characteristics of
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the detector unavailabilities. However, unlike previous formulations in the literature for
the nonuniform unavailability problem, formulation SPqt explicitly considers di↵erent
backup detection levels, a feature inherited from formulation SP-U. This feature allows
an approximation where the maximum degree of the nonlinear products considered can be
determined by the modeler, allowing her/him to manipulate the balance between solution
accuracy and problem complexity. Making use of this feature, and leveraging the results
presented in Section 6, formulation SPqt was truncated at the second detection level to ob-
tain a quadratic formulation (SPqt-Q) that provides a good compromise between accuracy
and complexity. This formulation was solved directly as an MIQP and via two proposed
exact linear reformulation strategies. Finally, the quadratic formulation results were com-
pared with those of other approximate solution strategies for the full MINLP. Formulation
SPqt-Q outperformed all of the other approaches, demonstrating its potential to obtain
near-optimal solutions to the non-uniform unavailability detector placement problem for
real non-uniform unavailability values.
8.1 Future Work
For the future work, from the modeling perspective there is interest in the analysis of
larger and more complete data sets. The burden in these approaches is the identification
and computation of the set of dispersion simulations. Statistical analysis of larger data
sets will allow one to properly determine the size of the uncertainty space that must be
considered. We are specially interested in finding good solutions with fewer scenarios.
For the particular case of gas detectors, this uncertainty space includes leak rate, leak
location, leak direction, and ventilation rate and direction. What is the relation between
the solution obtained with a representative size of scenarios and that of the original, full
stochastic problem? How are the parameters in the uncertainty space related to the optimal
scenario sample size? As well, sensitivity analysis of more complete sets of data will result
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in the identification of the relevant metrics to include in this type of analysis. This work
considered time to detection as the metric to minimize in the objective function. This
study can include other metrics like cloud volume, cloud shape, and cost (e.g., wiring
costs, maintenance costs, repair activities and ultimately consequence costs), and how
they related to the damage coe cient, da,i. Finally, we are also interested in testing the
proposed formulations for other type of detection and mitigation systems (e.g. toxic, flame,
and smoke detection systems). This will further validate the general applicability of the
formulation presented, and its future extensions, to the general mitigation system detector
placement problem.
From the computational point of view, several interesting research questions arise.
First, a stochastic problem such as the gas detector placement problem can be solved
by decomposing the problem by scenarios. Decomposing the problem by scenarios and
using parallel computing strategies can be specially useful for large problem instances.
Progressive Hedging (PH) (Rockafellar and Wets, 1991) is one of such decomposition
strategies. It is an iterative method which solves scenario sub-problems separately and
then enforces implementability. Based on preliminary results, using the PH module in
Pyomo, this stands as a good alternative for large sets of data. However, further testing
is still required. Second, in the case of formulation SPqt-Q, it is worth exploring other
linear reformulation strategies and improve the ones already proposed (e.g., improving the
tightness of formulation SPqt-L2 as suggested in Section 7.4). Finally, the development
and assessment of specialized solution algorithms for the proposed formulations is also
an area of interest. For example, for full-sized problems in water networks, Berry et al.
(2009b) found that a variation of the Greedy Randomized Search Procedure (GRASP) for
the PMP (Resende and Werneck, 2004) always provided the best solution when compared
against five other approaches implemented in the paper. Are these results valid for large
instances of the gas detector placement under realistic detector unavailabilities? If yes, for
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which instances is recommended to use mathematical programming approximations and
for which should approaches like the GRASP be used?
Ultimately, the goal is for the industry to be able to benefit from the use of these
formulations. All of the above mentioned and future e↵orts need to improve the approach
and aim to bring optimization-based gas detector placement into practice.
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APPENDIX A
NOTATION AND DATA REQUIREMENTS
Symbol Meaning
L“t1, 2, . . . , Nu Set of candidate detector locations (Indexed by l)
A“t1, 2, . . . , Mu Set of hazardous scenarios (Indexed by a)
R“t0, 1, . . . ,Cu Set of coverage levels (Indexed by r)
Da“t1, 2, . . . ,Cu Set of dummy locations for scenario a
La“t1, 2, . . . , Nau Set of candidate detector locations a↵ected by scenario a (Indexed by i)
Ra,i“t0, 1, . . . ,Ca,iu Set of coverage levels for the pair of location i and scenario a (Indexed by r)
L†a,i“t1, 2, . . . , i´ 1u Set of locations in La with a damage coe cient lower than that of location i (Indexed by j)
L°a,i“ti` 1, i` 2, . . . , Nau Set of locations in La with a damage coe cient higher than that of location i (Indexed by j)
sl Indicator for an installed detector at location l
xa,i Indicator for location i that first detect scenario a
ya,i Continuos dummy relaxation variable for the pair of location i and scenario a
za,i Continuos variable representing scenario a r“1 interactions given the selection of location i at r“0
xa,i,r Indicator for location i that first detect scenario a at a coverage level r
wa,i, j Indicator for detection of scenario a by locations i and j at coverage levels 0 and 1, respectively.
 a,i,rpxq Summation of failure combinations resulting in scenario a detection at coverage level r by a detector at location i
da,i Damage coe cient for scenario a at location i
 s,l Euclidean distance from leak source location s to candidate detector location l
↵a Probability of scenario a
↵s Probability associated with leak source s
q Detector unavailability for the given type of detector
q¯i Time-averaged unavailability for detector at location i
dmax Damage coe cient for undetected scenarios
p Maximum number of detectors allowed
k Number of detectors required for leak detection confirmation
Table A.1: Formulations Notation
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APPENDIX B
DATA FILES EXAMPLES
This appendix includes simplified examples of each of the three data files which are
used in the stochastic programming formulations and algorithms presented in this work.
The first data file contains the leak positions within the volume of study. The name of
this file is DeckLeakPos.py.
# leak_coordinates: Dictionary indexed by scenario number that \
returns a list of the x,y,z leak coordinates
leak_coordinates = {’1’:list([25,15,0]),’2’:list([55,30,0]),\
’3’:list([25,30,0]),’4’:list([55,15,0])}
The second data file contains the candidate detector locations positions within the vol-
ume of study. The name of this file is DeckLocations.py.
# location_coordinates: Dictionary indexed by candidate detector\
location that returns a list of the x,y,z location coordinates
location_coordinates = {’1’:list([30,15,0]),’2’:list([40,15,0]),\
’3’:list([50,15,0]),’4’:list([25,20,0]),’5’:list([45,20,0]),\
’6’:list([55,20,0]),’7’:list([25,25,0]),’8’:list([40,25,0]),\
’9’:list([55,25,0])}
The third data file contains location indexes, scenario indexes, and damage coe cient
data parsed from the original GexCon files. The name of this file is Deck-p-LFL10.py.
# This module contains the following data arrays necessary \
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to run the model:
# all_locations: List of locations indexes in the Gexcon files
# all_scenarios: List of scenario indexes in the Gexcon files
# useful_locations: Set of locations that actually detect
# detected_scenarios: Set of scenarios that are actually detected
# detection_dict: Dictionary indexed by scenarios that return a \
set of all sensor locations that impact that scenario
# damage_dict: Dictionary indexed by scenarios that maps a \
tuple of (scenario_idx: sensor_id, damage_coefficient)
all_locations = [’1’,’2’,’3’,’4’,’5’,’6’,’7’,’8’,’9’]
all_scenarios = [’4’,’3’,’2’,’1’]
useful_locations = set([’1’,’2’,’3’,’4’,’5’,’6’,’7’,’8’,’9’])
detected_scenarios = set([’4’,’3’,’2’,’1’])
detection_dict = {’4’:set([’2’,’3’,’4’,’5’,’6’]),\
’3’:set([’4’,’7’]),’2’:set([’6’,’9’]),’1’:set([’1’,’2’,’3’,’5’])}
damage_dict = {’4’:{’3’:5,’2’:10,’6’:9,’5’:15,’4’:25},\
’3’:{’7’:6,’4’:12},’2’:{’9’:4,’6’:11},\
’1’:{’1’:5,’2’:9,’5’:14,’6’:19,’3’:23}}
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APPENDIX C
MAIN DETECTOR PLACEMENT RUN FILE
This is the main Python file. This file performs the following tasks: 1. Query and
manipulates the user input, 2. Based on the user inputs, calls the pre-processing file (Ap-
pendix D) to process the data, 3. Calls the model files necessary to build the stochastic
detector placement problems or runs the random/greedy placement algorithms, 4. Calls
the solving routine in the post-processing file (Appendix E) if neccesary, 5. And returns
the placement results. This file is named main.py.
import sys, random, gc, post, pre, plot_locations, layout_paper, \
matplotlib, time, numpy, os, string, coopr.environ
researchDir = string.replace(os.getcwd(),’concrete’,’’)
sys.path.append(researchDir+’/data/testExample/’)
sys.path.append(researchDir+’/data/testExample2/’)
sys.path.append(researchDir+’/data/interDeck/’)
sys.path.append(researchDir+’/data/upperDeck/’)
sys.path.append(researchDir+’/data/mainDeck/’)
sys.path.append(researchDir+’/data/mezzaDeck/’)
sys.path.append(researchDir+’/models/’)
if len(sys.argv) != 8:
print ’Command line should read:’
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print ’˜/$ python main.py <seed> <Number of scenarios> \
<Model> <Number of detectors string> <Number of co-location \
levels> <Model Test> <Data Set> \n’
print ’<Number of detectors string>: 1,2,3,5-10,100-97’
print ’<Model>: R, GC, VA, LSCP, MCLP, MSDP, SP, SPU, SPUV, \
oiwSP, tSPqQ, tSPqL1 or tSPqL2’
print ’<Model Test>: SP, SPU, or SPUV.’
print ’<Data Set>: testExample, testExample2, \
interDeck-p-LFL10, interDeck-p-LFL30, mainDeck-p-LFL10, \
mainDeck-p-LFL30, upperDeck-p-LFL10, upperDeck-p-LFL30, \
mezzaDeck-p-LFL10 and mezzaDeck-p-LFL30’
sys.exit()
seed_number = sys.argv[1]
num_scenarios = int(sys.argv[2])
model_to_use = str(sys.argv[3])
max_sensors = str(sys.argv[4])
colocation = int(sys.argv[5])
model_to_test = str(sys.argv[6])
data_set = str(sys.argv[7])
data = __import__(data_set)
all_locations = data.all_locations
detected_scenarios = data.detected_scenarios
useful_locations = data.useful_locations
detection_dict = data.detection_dict
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damage_dict = data.damage_dict
gap = 0.0
fail_prob = float()
backup_levels = int()
voting_logic = int()
if model_to_use in (’R’,’C’,’VA’,’LSCP’,’MRP’,’MCLP’,\
’MSDP’,’SP’,’oiwSP’):
fail_prob = 0.0
backup_levels = 0
voting_logic = 0
if model_to_use in (’SPU’,’SPq’):
fail_prob = 0.1
backup_levels = 4
voting_logic = 1
if model_to_use in (’SPqQ’,’SPqL1’,’SPqL2’,’tSPqQ’,\
’tSPqL1’,’tSPqL2’):
backup_levels = 1
if model_to_use == ’SPUV’:
fail_prob = 0.1
backup_levels = 4
voting_logic = 2
max_sensors_list = pre.numberSensors(max_sensors)
num_scenarios,valid_scenarios = pre.validScenarios(num_scenarios,\
data_set,detected_scenarios,detection_dict)
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scenarios_to_use = scenarios_to_use_test = scenarios_available = \
pre.scenariosToUse(seed_number,valid_scenarios,num_scenarios)
useful_locations_plus_dummies,detection_dict,damage_dict,\
max_damage = pre.addDummy(damage_dict,useful_locations,\
detection_dict,backup_levels)
sensor_impact_tuples = pre.sensorImpactTuples(scenarios_to_use,\
useful_locations,detection_dict)
sorted_list_dict,sorted_damage_dict = pre.sortByDamage(damage_dict)
sensor_backup_tuples, Rai, objective_terms = pre.sensorBackupTuples\
(scenarios_to_use,sorted_damage_dict,backup_levels,sensor_impact_\
tuples)
MSDP_damage_dict = pre.MSDPDamageDict(scenarios_to_use,\
location_coordinates,leak_coordinates,colocation_levels)
facility_life = 175316
steps = 100
repairs = 3
repairTimes, qti, qAverage = dict(), dict(), dict()
repairTimes = pre.randomRepairTimes2(useful_locations_plus_dummies\
,facility_life,repairs,1)
qti = pre.qti(useful_locations_plus_dummies,facility_life,steps,\
repairTimes)
qAverage = pre.qAverage(useful_locations_plus_dummies,repairs,\
repairTimes,facility_life)
location_coordinates,leak_coordinates = plot_locations.\
getData(data_set)
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t0model = time.time()
if model_to_use == "R":
from R import *
if model_to_use == ’VA’:
from VA import *
if model_to_use == ’MSDP’:
from SP import *
model_instance = SP(scenarios_to_use,all_locations_after_\
colocation,MSDP_damage_dict,sensor_impact_tuples)
if model_to_use == ’SP’:
from SP import *
model_instance = SP(scenarios_to_use,useful_locations,\
detection_dict,damage_dict,sensor_impact_tuples)
if model_to_use == ’SPU’:
from SPU import *
model_instance = SPU(scenarios_to_use,useful_locations,\
detection_dict,damage_dict,fail_prob,backup_levels,\
sensor_impact_tuples,sensor_backup_tuples,max_damage,\
colocation)
if model_to_use == ’SPUV’:
from SPUV import *
model_instance = SPUV(scenarios_to_use,useful_locations,\
detection_dict,damage_dict,fail_prob,backup_levels,\
voting_logic,sensor_impact_tuples,sensor_backup_tuples,\
max_damage,Rai,objective_terms,colocation)
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if model_to_use == "GC":
from GC import *
if model_to_use == "MCLP":
from MCLP import *
model_instance = MCLP(scenarios_to_use,useful_locations,\
detection_dict_before_dummies,voting_logic)
if model_to_use == ’oiwSP’:
from oiwSP import *
model_instance = oiwSP(scenarios_to_use,useful_locations,\
detection_dict,damage_dict,qAverage,sensor_impact_tuples,\
max_damage)
if model_to_use == ’tSPqQ’:
from tSPqQ import *
model_instance = tSPqQ(scenarios_to_use,useful_locations,\
detection_dict,damage_dict,qti,sensor_impact_tuples,\
sensor_backup_tuples,max_damage,Rai,sorted_list_dict,\
objective_terms,colocation,facility_life)
if model_to_use == ’tSPqL1’:
from tSPqL1 import *
model_instance = tSPqL1(scenarios_to_use,useful_locations,\
detection_dict,damage_dict,qti,sensor_impact_tuples,\
sensor_backup_tuples,max_damage,Rai,sorted_list_dict,\
objective_terms,colocation,facility_life)
if model_to_use == ’tSPqL2’:
from tSPqL2 import *
model_instance = tSPqL2(scenarios_to_use,useful_locations,\
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detection_dict,damage_dict,qti,sensor_impact_tuples,\
sensor_backup_tuples,max_damage,Rai,sorted_list_dict,\
objective_terms,colocation,facility_life)
if model_to_use == ’GH’:
from GH import *
if model_to_use == ’IGH’:
from IGH import *
if model_to_use == "R":
sensors_used = R(scenarios_to_use,useful_locations,\
sorted_list_dict,damage_dict,max_damage,max_sensors,\
repairTimes,facility_life)
if model_to_use == "C":
sensors_used = C(max_sensors,detection_dict,\
useful_locations,scenarios_to_use)
if model_to_use == ’VA’:
sensors_used = VA(all_locations,location_coordinates,data_set)
if model_to_use == ’GH’:
sensors_used = GH(scenarios_to_use,useful_locations,\
sorted_list_dict,damage_dict,max_damage,max_sensors,\
repairTimes,facility_life)
if model_to_use == ’IGH’:
sensors_used = IGH(scenarios_to_use,useful_locations,\
sorted_list_dict,damage_dict,max_damage,max_sensors,\
repairTimes,facility_life)
if model_to_use not in (’R’,’VA’,’C’,’GH’,’IGH’):
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model_instance.max_sensors = max_sensors
model_instance.preprocess()
t1model = time.time() - t0model
t0results = time.time()
(instance,results) = post.solve_instance(model_to_use,\
model_instance,gap)
t1results = time.time() - t0results
(results,objective,sensors_used) = post.print_results\
(instance,results)
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APPENDIX D
PRE-PROCESSING FILE
This is the pre-processing Python file. This file contains all the functions that are called
in the main Python file (main.py, Appendix C) to prepare the data files to be used by the
detector placement formulations and algorithms. This file is named pre.py.
def numberSensors(x):
result = []
for part in x.split(’,’):
if ’-’ in part:
a, b = part.split(’-’)
a, b = int(a), int(b)
if a < b:
result.extend(range(a, b + 1,+1))
if a > b:
result.extend(range(a, b - 1,-1))
else:
a = int(part)
result.append(a)
return result
# Create the set of random scenarios.
def validScenarios(num_scenarios,data_set,detected_scenarios,\
detection_dict):
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valid_scenarios = set()
for scen in detected_scenarios:
if data_set not in (’testExample’,’testExample2’):
if len(detection_dict[scen]) > 9:
valid_scenarios.add(scen)
else:
valid_scenarios.add(scen)
if len(valid_scenarios) < int(num_scenarios):
num_scenarios = len(valid_scenarios)
return num_scenarios,valid_scenarios
# Choose the scenarios that are going to be use from the \
pool of random scenarios available and Create a list of \
scenarios and locations to use
def scenariosToUse(seed_number,valid_scenarios,num_scenarios):
import random
random.seed(int(seed_number))
return set(random.sample(valid_scenarios,num_scenarios))
#Add the dummy locations
def addDummy(damage_dict_before_dummies,\
locations_before_dummies,detection_dict_before_dummies,\
backup_levels):
from copy import deepcopy
useful_locations_plus_dummies = \
set(locations_before_dummies)
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detection_dict_after_dummies = \
deepcopy(detection_dict_before_dummies)
damage_dict_after_dummies = \
deepcopy(damage_dict_before_dummies)
max_damage = float()
for scen in damage_dict_after_dummies:
for sens in damage_dict_after_dummies[scen]:
max_damage = max(max_damage,float(\
damage_dict_after_dummies[scen][sens]))
max_damage = max_damage + 9.0
for k,v in damage_dict_after_dummies.items():
for l in range(0,backup_levels+1):
useful_locations_plus_dummies.add(’’.join\
([’Failed_to_detect_scenario_’,str(k),\
’_in_level_’,str(l)]))
detection_dict_after_dummies[k].add(’’.join\
([’Failed_to_detect_scenario_’,str(k),\
’_in_level_’,str(l)]))
damage_dict_after_dummies[k][’’.\
join([’Failed_to_detect_scenario_’,str(k),\
’_in_level_’,str(l)])] = max_damage+0.001*l
return useful_locations_plus_dummies,\
detection_dict_after_dummies,damage_dict_after_dummies\
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,max_damage
#Create the sensor impact tuples
def sensorImpactTuples(scenarios_to_use,sensors_to_use,\
detection_dict):
full_sensor_impact_tuples = [(scenario, sensor) for scenario \
in scenarios_to_use for sensor in detection_dict[scenario]]
sensor_impact_tuples = list()
for (scenario,sensor) in full_sensor_impact_tuples:
if scenario in scenarios_to_use:
sensor_impact_tuples.append((scenario,sensor))
return sensor_impact_tuples
#Sorting the damage coefficients, outer_keys = scenarios, \
inner_keys = locations affecting given scenario
def sortByDamage(damage_dict):
sorted_damage_dict = dict()
sorted_list_dict = dict()
outer_keys = damage_dict.keys()
for outer_key in outer_keys:
inner_keys = damage_dict[outer_key].keys()
sort_dict = [x for x in damage_dict[outer_key].\
iteritems()]
sort_dict.sort(key=lambda x:x[1])
sorted_damage_dict[outer_key] = sort_dict
for scen in sorted_damage_dict.keys():
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sorted_list_dict[scen] = [x[0] for x in \
sorted_damage_dict[scen]]
return sorted_list_dict, sorted_damage_dict
#Return sensor_backup_tuples, Rai, and objective_terms
#sensor_backup_tuples: Tuples of the possible scenario, \
location, and backup_level combinations
#Rai: Dictionary indexed by (scenario,location) that returns \
a set of the possible backup levels that the given \
(scenario,location) tuple can occupy
#objective_terms: Dictionary indexed by (scenario,backup_level) \
that returns a set of the locations that can occupy that \
backup_level for the given scenario
def sensorBackupTuples(scenarios_to_use,sorted_damage_dict,\
backup_levels,sensor_impact_tuples):
sensor_backup_tuples = list()
Rai = dict(((scen,sens),[]) for scen,sens in \
sensor_impact_tuples)
objective_terms = dict(((scen,r),[]) for scen in \
scenarios_to_use for r in range(0,backup_levels+1))
for scenario in scenarios_to_use:
for x in sorted_damage_dict[scenario]:
for r in range(0,backup_levels+1):
if r<= sorted_damage_dict[scenario].index(x)\
and not ’Failed’ in str(x[0]):
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sensor_backup_tuples.append((scenario,\
x[0],r))
Rai[scenario,x[0]].append(r)
objective_terms[scenario,r].append(x[0])
if r <= sorted_damage_dict[scenario].index(x)\
and ’Failed’ in str(x[0]):
if ’’.join([’_in_level_’,str(r)]) in \
str(x[0]):
sensor_backup_tuples.append((scenario,\
x[0],r))
Rai[scenario,x[0]].append(r)
objective_terms[scenario,r].\
append(x[0])
return sensor_backup_tuples, Rai, objective_terms
#Create a damage dictionary where the damage \
is the distance from the leak to the candidate detector location
def MSDPDamageDict(scenarios_to_use,location_coordinates \
,leak_coordinates,colocation_levels):
MSDPDamageDict = dict((scen,{}) for scen in scenarios_to_use)
for scenario in scenarios_to_use:
scenarioDict = dict()
x_scen = leak_coordinates[scenario[:-4]][0]
y_scen = leak_coordinates[scenario[:-4]][1]
z_scen = leak_coordinates[scenario[:-4]][2]
for sens in location_coordinates:
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x_sens = location_coordinates[sens][0]
y_sens = location_coordinates[sens][1]
z_sens = location_coordinates[sens][2]
dist = ((x_scen - x_sens)**2 + (y_scen - \
y_sens)**2 + (z_scen - z_sens)**2)**0.5
scenarioDict[sens] = dist
MSDPDamageDict[scenario] = scenarioDict
MSDPDamageDictAfterColocation = dict((scen,{}) \
for scen in scenarios_to_use)
for scen in MSDPDamageDict:
colocationDict = dict()
for k in range(1,colocation_levels+1):
for sens, damage in MSDPDamageDict[scen].items():
colocationDict[’-’.join([str(sens),str(k)])]\
= damage+1*(k-1)
MSDPDamageDictAfterColocation[scen] = \
colocationDict
return MSDPDamageDictAfterColocation
def randomRepairTimes(sensors,\
facility_life,numberOfRepairs,seed):
tr = dict()
import random
random.seed(seed)
for sensor in sensors:
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tr[sensor] = sorted(random.sample(range(int(
facility_life)),numberOfRepairs) + [0])
return tr
def qt(sens,t,repairs):
if ’Failed’ in sens:
return 0.0
else:
trleft = [i for i in repairs if i <= t]
return 1.73 * 10**(-6) * (t - min(trleft, \
key=lambda x:abs(x-t)))
def qti(sensors,L,n,tr):
qti = dict()
for k in range(0,n+1):
t = k*L/float(n)
q = dict()
for sens in sensors:
q[sens] = qt(sens,t,tr[sens])
qti[t] = q
return qti
def qAverage(sensors_used,numberOfRepairs,tr,facility_life):
qAverage = dict()
for sens in sensors_used:
qArea = 0
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for repair in range(1,numberOfRepairs+1):
qArea += (tr[sens][repair] - tr[sens][repair-1])*\
qt(sens,tr[sens][repair]-0.000001,tr[sens]) / 2
qArea += (facility_life - tr[sens][numberOfRepairs])*\
qt(sens,facility_life,tr[sens]) / 2
qAverage[sens] = qArea / facility_life
return qAverage
def individualq(useful_locations_plus_dummies):
q = dict((sens,()) for sens in useful_locations_plus_dummies)
for sens in useful_locations_plus_dummies:
if ’Failed’ in sens:
q[sens] = 0.05
else:
q[sens] = 0.05
return q
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APPENDIX E
POST-PROCESSING FILE
This is the post-processing Python file. This file contains the functions necessary to
build the model instances. Also, it contains the functions necessary to analyze the results
obtained from the main Python file (main.py, Appendix C). This file is named post.py.
from coopr.pyomo import *
from pyutilib.misc import Options
from coopr.opt import SolverFactory
import math, sys, itertools, coopr.environ
def solve_instance(model,instance,gap):
if model == ’LSCP’ or model == ’MRP’ or model == ’MCLP’ \
or model == ’MSDP’ or model == ’SP’ or model == ’SPU’ \
or model == ’SPUV’ or model == ’oiwSP’ or model == ’tSPqL1’ \
or model == ’tSPqL2’:
opt = SolverFactory(’gurobi’,solver_io=’lp’)
opt.set_options(’ ’.join([’TimeLimit=100000’,’Threads=1’]))
if model == ’SPq’:
opt = SolverFactory(’cplex’,solver_io=’lp’)
if model == ’SPqQ’ or model == ’tSPqQ’:
opt = SolverFactory(’cplex’,solver_io=’lp’)
results = opt.solve(instance,tee=True,keepfiles=False,\
warmstart=False)
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return instance, results
def print_results(instance,results):
stat = str(results.Solver.Termination_condition) \
sensors_used = set()
if stat == ’optimal’ or stat == ’maxTimeLimit’:
instance.load(results)
objective = (value(instance.obj))
for sens in instance.s.keys():
if instance.s[sens].stale == False:
if value(instance.s[sens]) > 0.01:
sensors_used.add(sens)
elif stat == ’infeasible’:
objective = -1
num_sens = -1
fraction_detected = -1
print ’Problem infeasible.’
else:
print ’Bad things are happening. Trust nothing.’
sys.exit()
return results,objective,sensors_used
# Calculate the fraction of scenarios covered
def fraction_covered(scenarios_to_use,sensors_to_use,\
detection_dict,sensors_used,voting_logic):
scenarios_detected = float()
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for scen in scenarios_to_use:
scenario_sensors = float()
for sens in sensors_used:
if sens in detection_dict[scen]:
scenario_sensors = scenario_sensors + 1
if scenario_sensors >= voting_logic:
scenarios_detected = scenarios_detected + 1
return scenarios_detected/len(scenarios_to_use)
def evaluation(scenarios_to_use,sensors_used,sorted_list_dict,\
damage_dict,qi,k,max_damage):
expr = 0.0
for scen in scenarios_to_use:
ProbSum = 0.0
ordered_used_in_La = [sens for sens in sorted_list_dict\
[scen] if sens in sensors_used]
for sensa in ordered_used_in_La:
LaiLess = set(ordered_used_in_La[:ordered_used_in_La.\
index(sensa)])
if len(LaiLess) >= k-1:
combinations = itertools.combinations(LaiLess,\
len(LaiLess)-k+1)
for combination in combinations:
if len(combination) <= 100:
ProbProd = 1.0
for sensb in combination:
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ProbProd *= qi[sensb]
for sensc in LaiLess.difference(combination):
ProbProd *= 1.0-qi[sensc]
expr += damage_dict[scen][sensa]*(1.0 - \
qi[sensa]) * ProbProd
ProbSum += (1.0 - qi[sensa]) * ProbProd
expr += max_damage * (1-ProbSum)
return expr/len(scenarios_to_use)
def evaluationDynamic(scenarios_to_use_test,sensors_used,\
sorted_list_dict,damage_dict,repairTimes,k,max_damage,L):
import pre
n = 100
expr = 0
qti = pre.qti(sensors_used,L,n,repairTimes)
expr += evaluation(scenarios_to_use_test,sensors_used,\
sorted_list_dict,damage_dict,qti[0],k,max_damage)/2
expr += evaluation(scenarios_to_use_test,sensors_used,\
sorted_list_dict,damage_dict,qti[L],k,max_damage)/2
for counter in range(1,n):
expr += evaluation(scenarios_to_use_test,sensors_used,\
sorted_list_dict,damage_dict,qti[counter*L/float(n)],k,\
max_damage)
return expr / n
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APPENDIX F
FORMULATION SP: PYOMO MODEL FILE
This is the Pyomo file that contains detector placement formulation SP as described in
Section 2.1. This file is named SP.py.
from coopr.pyomo import *
def SP(scenarios_to_use, useful_locations, sensor_impact_dict, \
damage_coeffs, sensor_impact_tuples):
model = ConcreteModel()
model.s = Var(useful_locations, within=Binary)
model.x = Var(sensor_impact_tuples, bounds=(0.0,1.0))
model.max_sensors = Param(mutable=True, initialize=0)
def obj_rule (model):
return 1.0/len(scenarios_to_use)*(sum(damage_coeffs[scen]\
[sens]*model.x[(scen, sens)] for (scen,sens) in \
sensor_impact_tuples))
model.obj = Objective(rule = obj_rule)
def max_sensors_rule(model):
return sum(model.s[sens] for sens in useful_locations) \
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<= model.max_sensors
model.max_sensors_con = Constraint(rule = max_sensors_rule)
def sensor_binary_rule(model, scen, sens):
if ’Failed’ in str(sens):
return Constraint.Skip
else:
return model.x[(scen, sens)] <= model.s[sens]
model.sensor_binary_con = Constraint(sensor_impact_tuples, \
rule = sensor_binary_rule)
def event_detection_rule(model, scen):
return sum(model.x[(scen,sens)] for sens in \
sensor_impact_dict[scen]) == 1
model.event_detection_con = Constraint(scenarios_to_use, \
rule = event_detection_rule)
return model
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APPENDIX G
FORMULATION SP-U: PYOMO MODEL FILE
This is the Pyomo file that contains detector placement formulation SP-U as described
in Section 3.1. This file is named SPU.py.
from coopr.pyomo import *
import math
def SPU(scenarios_to_use,location_s,sensor_impact_dict,\
damage_coeffs,q,backup_levels,sensor_impact_tuples,\
sensor_backup_tuples,max_damage,colocation):
model = ConcreteModel()
model.s = Var(location_s,bounds=(0.0,colocation),\
within=Integers)
model.R = RangeSet(0,backup_levels)
model.x = Var(sensor_backup_tuples,bounds=(0.0,1.0))
model.max_sensors = Param(mutable=True,initialize=0)
def obj_rule (model):
return 1.0/len(scenarios_to_use)*sum(math.pow(q,r)*\
(1-q)*damage_coeffs[scen][sens]*model.x[(scen,sens,r)]\
for (scen,sens,r) in sensor_backup_tuples)
model.obj = Objective(rule = obj_rule)
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def event_detection_rule(model,scen,r):
return sum(model.x[(scen,sens,r)] for sens in \
sensor_impact_dict[scen] if (scen,sens,r) in \
sensor_backup_tuples) == 1
model.event_detection_con = Constraint(scenarios_to_use,\
model.R,rule = event_detection_rule)
def max_sensors_rule(model):
return sum(model.s[sens] for sens in location_s)\
<= model.max_sensors
model.max_sensors_con = Constraint(rule = max_sensors_rule)
def coverage_priority_rule(model,scen,sens):
if ’Failed’ in str(sens):
return Constraint.Skip
else:
return sum(model.x[(scen,sens,r)] for r in model.R\
if (scen,sens,r) in sensor_backup_tuples) <=\
model.s[sens]
model.coverage_priority_con =\
Constraint(sensor_impact_tuples,
rule = coverage_priority_rule)
return model
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APPENDIX H
FORMULATION SP-UV: PYOMO MODEL FILE
This is the Pyomo file that contains detector placement formulation SP-UV as de-
scribed in Section 4.1. This file is named SPUV.py.
from coopr.pyomo import *
import math
def binomialCoefficient(n, k):
if k < 0 or k > n:
return 0
if k > n - k:
k = n - k
c = 1
for i in range(k):
c = c * (n - (k - (i+1)))
c = c // (i+1)
return c
def SPUV(scenarios_to_use, sensors_to_use,sensor_impact_dict,\
damage_coeffs,q,backup_levels,k,sensor_impact_tuples,\
sensor_backup_tuples,max_damage,Rai,objective_terms,\
colocation):
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def domain_rule(model,scenario,sensor,level):
if level <= k-1:
return Binary
if level > k-1:
return Reals
model = ConcreteModel()
model.s = Var(sensors_to_use,bounds=(0.0,colocation),\
within=Integers)
model.x = Var(sensor_backup_tuples, bounds=(0.0,1.0),\
domain=domain_rule)
model.R = RangeSet(0,backup_levels)
model.R5 = RangeSet(0,k-1)
model.max_sensors = Param(mutable=True, initialize=0)
def obj_rule (model):
return 1.0/len(scenarios_to_use)*\
sum(binomialCoefficient(r,r-k+1)*math.pow(q,r-k+1)*\
math.pow(1-q,k) * damage_coeffs[scen][sens]*\
model.x[scen,sens,r] for (scen,sens,r) in\
sensor_backup_tuples)
model.obj = Objective(rule = obj_rule)
def event_detection_rule2(model, scen, r):
return sum(model.x[scen,sens,r] for sens in\
objective_terms[scen,r]) == 1
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model.event_detection_con2 = Constraint(scenarios_to_use,\
model.R, rule = event_detection_rule2)
def max_sensors_rule(model):
return sum(model.s[sens] for sens in sensors_to_use)\
<= model.max_sensors
model.max_sensors_con = Constraint(rule = max_sensors_rule)
def coverage_priority_rule1(model,scen,r):
return sum(damage_coeffs[scen][sens]*model.x[scen,sens,r]\
for sens in objective_terms[scen,r]) <=\
sum(damage_coeffs[scen][sens]*model.x[scen,sens,r+1] \
for sens in objective_terms[scen,r+1])
model.coverage_priority_con1 = Constraint(scenarios_to_use,\
model.R5, rule = coverage_priority_rule1)
def coverage_priority_rule2(model, scen, sens):
if ’Failed’ in str(sens):
return Constraint.Skip
else:
return sum(model.x[scen,sens,r] for r in\
Rai[scen,sens]) <= model.s[sens]
model.coverage_priority_con2 = Constraint(sensor_impact_tuples,\
rule = coverage_priority_rule2)
return model
155
APPENDIX I
GREEDY COVERAGE (GC) ALGORITHM: PYTHON FILE
This is the Python file that implements the Greedy Coverage (GC) algorithm described
in Section 5.1.4. This file is named GC.py.
import post
def GC(max_sensors,detection_dict,locations,scenarios):
sensors_used = set()
k = 1
for i in range(1,max_sensors+1):
maximum = 0.0
for sens in locations:
frac = post.fraction_covered(scenarios,locations,\
detection_dict,sensors_used.union(set([str(sens)])),k)
if frac > maximum:
maximum = float(frac)
newSens = str(sens)
sensors_used.add(newSens)
if frac == 1.0:
k += 1
print k
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if k == 3:
print ’k=3 for ’, len(sensors_used), ’sensors’
break
return sensors_used
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APPENDIX J
FORMULATION MCLP: PYOMO MODEL FILE
This is the Pyomo file that contains detector placement formulationMCLP as described
in Section 5.1.4. This file is named MCLP.py.
from coopr.pyomo import *
def MCLP(scenarios_to_use, sensors_to_use, sensor_impact_dict, \
voting_logic):
model = ConcreteModel()
model.x = Var(scenarios_to_use, within=Binary)
model.s = Var(sensors_to_use, within=Binary)
model.max_sensors = Param(mutable=True, initialize=0)
def obj_rule (model):
return sum(model.x[scen] for scen in scenarios_to_use)
model.obj = Objective(rule = obj_rule, sense = maximize)
def sensor_coverage_rule(model, scen):
return sum(model.s[sens] for sens in \
sensor_impact_dict[scen]) >= voting_logic * model.x[scen]
model.sensor_coverage_con = Constraint(scenarios_to_use,rule \
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= sensor_coverage_rule)
def max_sensors_rule(model):
return sum(model.s[sens] for sens in sensors_to_use) <= \
model.max_sensors
model.max_sensors_con = Constraint(rule = max_sensors_rule)
return model
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APPENDIX K
FORMULATION SPqt-Q: PYOMO MODEL FILE
This is the Pyomo file that contains detector placement formulation SPqt-Q as de-
scribed in Section 7.3.1. This file is named tSPqQ.py.
from coopr.pyomo import *
import math
import numpy
import scipy
def tSPqQ(scenarios_to_use,sensors_to_use,sensor_impact_dict,\
damage_coeffs, qti, sensor_impact_tuples, sensor_backup_tuples,\
max_damage,Rai,sorted_list_dict,objective_terms,colocation,L):
Q_tuples = list()
backup_tuples_0 = list()
for scen in scenarios_to_use:
for sensa in objective_terms[(scen,0)]:
backup_tuples_0.append((scen,sensa,0))
indexa = sorted_list_dict[scen].index(sensa)
for sensb in objective_terms[(scen,1)]:
if sorted_list_dict[scen].index(sensb) > indexa:
Q_tuples.append((scen,sensa,sensb))
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model = ConcreteModel()
model.s = Var(sensors_to_use, bounds=(0.0,colocation), \
within=Integers)
model.R = RangeSet(0,1)
model.R1 = RangeSet(0,0)
model.x = Var(sensor_backup_tuples, within=Binary)
model.max_sensors = Param(mutable=True, initialize=0)
def Et1(model,t):
return (sum(damage_coeffs[scen][sens] * \
(1-qti[t][sens]) * model.x[(scen,sens,r)] for \
(scen,sens,r) in backup_tuples_0) + \
sum(damage_coeffs[scen][sensb] * (1-qti[t][sensb]) * \
qti[t][sensa] * model.x[(scen,sensa,0)] * \
model.x[(scen,sensb,1)] for (scen,sensa,sensb) in \
Q_tuples))/len(scenarios_to_use)
def obj_rule (model):
return (Et1(model,0)/2 + sum(Et1(model,t) for t in qti \
if t != 0 and t != L) + Et1(model,L)/2) / len(qti)
model.obj = Objective(rule = obj_rule)
def event_detection_rule(model, scen, r):
return sum(model.x[scen,sens,r] for sens in\
objective_terms[scen,r]) == 1
model.event_detection_con = Constraint(scenarios_to_use,\
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model.R, rule = event_detection_rule)
def max_sensors_rule(model):
return sum(model.s[sens] for sens in sensors_to_use)\
<= model.max_sensors
model.max_sensors_con = Constraint(rule = max_sensors_rule)
def coverage_priority_rule2(model, scen, sens):
if ’Failed’ in str(sens):
return Constraint.Skip
else:
return sum(model.x[scen,sens,r] for r in
Rai[scen,sens]) <= model.s[sens]
model.coverage_priority_con2 = Constraint(\
sensor_impact_tuples, rule = coverage_priority_rule2)
def coverage_priority_rule1(model,scen,r):
return sum(damage_coeffs[scen][sens]*\
model.x[scen,sens,r] for sens in objective_terms\
[scen,r]) <= sum(damage_coeffs[scen][sens]*\
model.x[scen,sens,r+1]
for sens in objective_terms[scen,r+1])
model.coverage_priority_con1 = Constraint(scenarios_to_use,\
model.R1, rule = coverage_priority_rule1)
return model
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APPENDIX L
FORMULATION SPqt-L1: PYOMO MODEL FILE
This is the Pyomo file that contains detector placement formulation SPqt-L1 as de-
scribed in Section 7.3.2. This file is named tSPqL1.py.
from coopr.pyomo import *
import math
import numpy
def tSPqL1(scenarios_to_use,sensors_to_use,sensor_impact_dict,\
damage_coeffs, qti, sensor_impact_tuples, sensor_backup_tuples,\
max_damage\,Rai,sorted_list_dict,objective_terms,colocation,L):
Q_tuples = list()
backup_tuples_0 = list()
for scen in scenarios_to_use:
for sensa in objective_terms[(scen,0)]:
backup_tuples_0.append((scen,sensa,0))
indexa = sorted_list_dict[scen].index(sensa)
for sensb in objective_terms[(scen,1)]:
if sorted_list_dict[scen].index(sensb) > indexa:
Q_tuples.append((scen,sensa,sensb))
model = ConcreteModel()
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model.s = Var(sensors_to_use, bounds=(0.0,colocation), \
within=Integers)
model.R = RangeSet(0,1)
model.R1 = RangeSet(0,0)
model.x = Var(sensor_backup_tuples, within=Binary)
model.w = Var(Q_tuples,bounds=(0.0,1.0))
model.max_sensors = Param(mutable=True, initialize=0)
def Et1(model,t):
return (sum(damage_coeffs[scen][sens] * \
(1-qti[t][sens]) * model.x[(scen,sens,r)] for \
(scen,sens,r) in backup_tuples_0) + \
sum(damage_coeffs[scen][sensb] * (1-qti[t][sensb]) * \
qti[t][sensa] * model.w[(scen,sensa,sensb)] for \
(scen,sensa,sensb) in Q_tuples))/len(scenarios_to_use)
def obj_rule (model):
return (Et1(model,0)/2 + sum(Et1(model,t) for t in qti \
if t != 0 and t != L) + Et1(model,L)/2) / len(qti)
model.obj = Objective(rule = obj_rule)
def additional_rule1(model,scen,sensa,sensb):
return model.w[(scen,sensa,sensb)] >= \
model.x[(scen,sensa,0)] + model.x[(scen,sensb,1)] - 1
model.additional_con1 = Constraint(Q_tuples, rule = \
additional_rule1)
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def event_detection_rule(model, scen, r):
return sum(model.x[scen,sens,r] for sens in \
objective_terms[scen,r]) == 1
model.event_detection_con = Constraint(scenarios_to_use, \
model.R, rule = event_detection_rule)
def max_sensors_rule(model):
return sum(model.s[sens] for sens in sensors_to_use) \
<= model.max_sensors
model.max_sensors_con = Constraint(rule = max_sensors_rule)
def coverage_priority_rule2(model, scen, sens):
if ’Failed’ in str(sens):
return Constraint.Skip
else:
return sum(model.x[scen,sens,r] for r in \
Rai[scen,sens]) <= model.s[sens]
model.coverage_priority_con2 = Constraint(\
sensor_impact_tuples, rule = coverage_priority_rule2)
def coverage_priority_rule1(model,scen,r):
return sum(damage_coeffs[scen][sens]*\
model.x[scen,sens,r] for sens in \
objective_terms[scen,r]) <= \
sum(damage_coeffs[scen][sens]*\
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model.x[scen,sens,r+1] for sens in \
objective_terms[scen,r+1])
model.coverage_priority_con1 = Constraint(scenarios_to_use, \
model.R1, rule = coverage_priority_rule1)
return model
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APPENDIX M
FORMULATION SPqt-L2: PYOMO MODEL FILE
This is the Pyomo file that contains detector placement formulation SPqt-L2 as de-
scribed in Section 7.3.3. This file is named tSPqL2.py.
from coopr.pyomo import *
import math
import numpy
def tSPqL2(scenarios_to_use,sensors_to_use,sensor_impact_dict,\
damage_coeffs, qti, sensor_impact_tuples, sensor_backup_tuples,\
max_damage\,Rai,sorted_list_dict,objective_terms,colocation,L):
backup_tuples_0 = list()
sensor_impact_tuples_0 = list()
for (scen,i,r) in sensor_backup_tuples:
if r == 0:
backup_tuples_0.append((scen,i,r))
sensor_impact_tuples_0.append((scen,i))
scenario_ir = dict((scen,list()) for scen in scenarios_to_use)
for scen in scenarios_to_use:
for sens in sensor_impact_dict[scen]:
for r in Rai[scen,sens]:
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scenario_ir[scen].append((sens,r))
model = ConcreteModel()
model.s = Var(sensors_to_use, bounds=(0.0,colocation), \
within=Integers)
model.R = RangeSet(0,1)
model.R1 = RangeSet(0,0)
model.x = Var(sensor_backup_tuples, within=Binary)
model.y = Var(sensor_impact_tuples_0, within=PositiveReals)
model.s2 = Var(sensor_impact_tuples_0, within=PositiveReals)
model.max_sensors = Param(mutable=True, initialize=0)
def Et1(model,t):
return sum(damage_coeffs[scen][i] * (1-qti[t][i]) * \
model.x[(scen,i,r)] for (scen,i,r) in backup_tuples_0)
def obj_rule (model):
return ((Et1(model,0)/2 + sum(Et1(model,t) for t in qti \
if t != 0 and t != L) + Et1(model,L)/2) / len(qti) + \
sum(model.s2[(scen,i)] for (scen,i) in \
sensor_impact_tuples_0)) / len(scenarios_to_use)
model.obj = Objective(rule = obj_rule)
def Et2(model,scen,sensa,t):
indexa = sorted_list_dict[scen].index(sensa)
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return sum(damage_coeffs[scen][sensb]*(1-qti[t][sensb]) * \
qti[t][sensa] * model.x[(scen,sensb,1)] for sensb in \
objective_terms[(scen,1)] if \
sorted_list_dict[scen].index(sensb) > indexa)
def linear_rule_1(model,scen,sensa):
return (Et2(model,scen,sensa,0)/2 + \
sum(Et2(model,scen,sensa,t) for t in qti \
if t!=0 and t!=L) + Et2(model,scen,sensa,L)/2) / len(qti)\
== model.y[(scen,sensa)] + model.s2[(scen,sensa)]
model.linear_con_1 = Constraint(\
sensor_impact_tuples_0,rule = linear_rule_1)
def linear_rule_2(model,scen,i): #15c
return model.y[(scen,i)] <= max_damage*(1-\
model.x[(scen,i,0)])
model.linear_con_2 = Constraint(\
sensor_impact_tuples_0,rule = linear_rule_2)
def event_detection_rule(model, scen, r):
return sum(model.x[scen,sens,r] for sens in \
objective_terms[scen,r]) == 1
model.event_detection_con = Constraint(\
scenarios_to_use, model.R, rule = event_detection_rule)
def max_sensors_rule(model):
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return sum(model.s[sens] for sens in sensors_to_use) \
<= model.max_sensors
model.max_sensors_con = Constraint(rule = max_sensors_rule)
def coverage_priority_rule2(model, scen, sens):
if ’Failed’ in str(sens):
return Constraint.Skip
else:
return sum(model.x[scen,sens,r] for r in \
Rai[scen,sens]) <= model.s[sens]
model.coverage_priority_con2 = Constraint(\
sensor_impact_tuples, rule = coverage_priority_rule2)
def coverage_priority_rule1(model,scen,r):
return sum(damage_coeffs[scen][sens]*\
model.x[scen,sens,r] for sens in \
objective_terms[scen,r]) <= \
sum(damage_coeffs[scen][sens]*\
model.x[scen,sens,r+1] for sens in \
objective_terms[scen,r+1])
model.coverage_priority_con1 = Constraint(\
scenarios_to_use, model.R1, rule = \
coverage_priority_rule1)
return model
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APPENDIX N
FORMULATION oiwSP: PYOMO MODEL FILE
This is the Pyomo file that contains detector placement formulation oiwSP as described
in Section 7.5. This file is named oiwSP.py.
from coopr.pyomo import *
def oiwSP(scenarios_to_use,locations_before_dummies,\
sensor_impact_dict, damage_coeffs, qi, \
sensor_impact_tuples,max_damage):
model = ConcreteModel()
model.s = Var(locations_before_dummies, within=Binary)
model.x = Var(sensor_impact_tuples, bounds=(0.0,1.0))
model.max_sensors = Param(mutable=True, initialize=0)
def obj_rule (model):
return 1.0/len(scenarios_to_use) * \
sum((damage_coeffs[scen][sens]*(1.0-qi[sens]) + \
max_damage*qi[sens]) * model.x[(scen, sens)] for \
(scen,sens) in sensor_impact_tuples)
model.obj = Objective(rule = obj_rule)
def max_sensors_rule(model):
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return sum(model.s[sens] for sens in \
locations_before_dummies) <= model.max_sensors
model.max_sensors_con = Constraint(rule = max_sensors_rule)
def sensor_binary_rule(model, scen, sens):
if ’Failed’ in str(sens):
return Constraint.Skip
else:
return model.x[(scen, sens)] <= model.s[sens]
model.sensor_binary_con = Constraint(sensor_impact_tuples, \
rule = sensor_binary_rule)
def event_detection_rule(model, scen):
return sum(model.x[(scen,sens)] for sens in \
sensor_impact_dict[scen]) == 1
model.event_detection_con = Constraint(scenarios_to_use, \
rule = event_detection_rule)
return model
172
APPENDIX O
GREEDY HEURISTIC (GH): PYTHON FILE
This is the Python file that implements the Greedy Heuristic (GH) described in Section
7.5. This file is named GH.py.
import post
def GH(scenarios_to_use,useful_locations,sorted_list_dict,\
damage_dict,max_damage,max_sensors,repairTimes,L):
sensors_used = set()
minimun = 10000.0
for i in range(max_sensors):
newSens = set()
for sens in useful_locations.difference(sensors_used):
value = post.evaluationDynamic(scenarios_to_use,\
sensors_used.union(set([sens])),sorted_list_dict,\
damage_dict,repairTimes,1,max_damage,L)
if value < minimun:
minimun = value
newSens = sens
sensors_used = sensors_used.union(set([newSens]))
return sensors_used
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APPENDIX P
IMPROVED GREEDY HEURISTIC (IGH): PYTHON FILE
This is the Python file that implements the Improved Greedy Heuristic (IGH) described
in Section 7.5. This file is named IGH.py.
import post
def IGH(scenarios_to_use,useful_locations,sorted_list_dict,\
damage_dict,max_damage,max_sensors,repairTimes,L):
GH = {1: set([’45’]),2:set([’45’,’137’]),3:set([’59’,’45’,’137’]),\
4: set([’137’, ’45’, ’59’, ’498’]), 5: set([’59’, ’45’, ’137’,\
’498’,’480’]) #GH Results
V = set(GH[max_sensors])
minimum = post.evaluationDynamic(scenarios_to_use,\
V,sorted_list_dict,damage_dict,repairTimes,1,\
max_damage,L)
for sens in GH[max_sensors]:
newSens = set([sens])
for loc in useful_locations:
value = post.evaluationDynamic(scenarios_to_use,\
V.difference(set([sens])).union(set([loc])),\
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sorted_list_dict,damage_dict,repairTimes,1,max_damage,L)
if value < minimum:
newSens = set([loc])
V = V.difference(set([sens])).union(newSens)
return V
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